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WHAT JUDGES TELL JURIES ABOUT NEGLIGENCE: A
REVIEW OF PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
PATRICK J. KELLEY* & LAUREL A. WENDT**
INTRODUCTION
If you attempt to describe accurately the substantive law of neg-
ligence in the United States, you will be forced, sooner or later, to
move beyond a bare statement of the prima facie case for the
negligence cause of action-usually formulated as duty, breach of
duty, cause in fact, proximate cause, and damages,-and toward a
description of the institutional practices employed in determining
negligence liability. That is so because the meaning of three out of
the five elements of the prima facie case is murky, at best,2 and
formally the jury is charged with the task of applying to the facts of
the individual case two of those three murky meanings: breach of
duty and proximate cause.
Although the practical primacy of the jury in applying the
proximate cause standard has been questioned,3 there is no doubt
that the jury plays the central role in applying the negligence stan-
dard, which is usually described in the scholarly literature as the
conduct of the ordinary reasonable person.
State constitutions guarantee the centrality of the jury in apply-
ing the negligence standard: negligence is considered a fact to be
determined by the jury under state constitutional provisions
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. We appreciate the
helpful comments of the other contributors to this symposium and the good work of Richard
Wright in organizing it all. We appreciate the work of Mark Stewart, interlibrary loan specialist
at S.I.U. law library, and the work of William Borders, Alison Dieterichs, Kelly Neff, William
Beckman, and Linnea Stack of the Chicago-Kent Law Review.
** Associate Professor and Associate Director, Southern Illinois University School of Law
Library.
1. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 269 (2000).
2. For a brief discussion of the indeterminacy of duty, breach of duty, and proximate
cause, see Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Dtty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law:
Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1041-43 (2001).
3. See id. at 1042, 1043; Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History,
Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 88-90 (1991).
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protecting the right to a jury trial in civil cases.4 The role of judges in
applying the negligence standard is, therefore, limited. When the
case is tried before a jury, the judge's role is only to define the
negligence standard for the jury in jury instructions and to ensure that
the jury's determination is within the range of reasonable applications
of the negligence standard as defined.
The range of reasonable applications of the negligence standard,
in most cases, encompasses both the judgment that the defendant
acted negligently and the judgment that the defendant did not act
negligently. Such a range results because the negligence standard
requires the jury to determine two things: what the defendant did,
and whether an ordinary reasonable person would have done what
the defendant did under the circumstances. The standard itself, then,
does not give the jury rule-like guidance, in that it does not tell the
jury what conduct is negligent under the circumstances. The history
of the development of the negligence standard in the early nineteenth
century suggests that the ordinary reasonable person standard of
conduct was adopted in order to preserve the jury's historic role in
judging the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct in tort actions.
S.F.C. Milsom, in his brilliant work, Historical Foundations of the
Common Law, 5 argues that the jury had the ultimate say in deter-
4. The following list of the constitutional provisions governing the right to trial by jury
shows that the constitutions of forty-eight states provide the right to a jury trial in civil actions.
(Louisiana and Maine do not provide for jury trials in civil actions.) The first list contains all
those state constitutions where a civil cause is explicitly mentioned. The second list contains all
those state constitutions where a civil cause is implicitly mentioned. For the purpose of these
lists, "explicit" means that a civil cause is mentioned in the provision cited and "implicit" means
that there is a general blanket right with no specific mention of civil causes.
Explicit: ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 16; COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 23; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19; GA. CONST. art.
1, § 1, $ 11; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 13; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; IND. CONST. art. I,
§ 20; MD. CONST. art. XXIII; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XV; MICH. CONST. art. I, §
14; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 31; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22(a):
MONT. CONST. art. 1I, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. I. § 6; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H.
CONST. pt. I, art. XX; N.J. CONST. art. I, $ 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.Y.
CONST. art I, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST.
art. 1, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 17; PA. CONST. art. 1, §
6; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21: W. VA. CONST. art. III, §§ 8, 9. 13; WIS. CONST. art. I, §
5; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Implicit: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 23; DEL. CONST. art.
I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IOWA CONST. art. I. § 9;
KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 5; KY. CONST. § 7; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C.
CONST. art. 1, § 14; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 15; VT. CONST.
chap. 1, art. 12.
5. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 283-313, 392-400
(2d ed. 1981).
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mining whether the defendant's conduct was wrongful for centuries.
A defendant could deny a plaintiff's claim of wrongfulness-a claim
implicit in trespass and explicit in trespass on the case-by simply
pleading the general issue: "Not guilty."6 The case would then be
sent from Westminster out to the county for the jury to decide. The
jury's decision was effectively insulated from review by the court at
Westminster. In the eighteenth century, procedures developed
through which the litigants could bring the facts developed at the jury
trial back to the court at Westminster.7 This threatened the primacy
of the jury in deciding whether a defendant's conduct was wrongful
or not. Further, it threatened to reduce the law of torts to a multi-
tude of very specific legal rules of conduct because the courts at
Westminster ruled as a matter of law on individual cases brought
back from the jury. The "ordinary reasonable man standard of
conduct" in negligence cases responded to both these threats. The
formal legal statement of the standard as the conduct of the ordinary
reasonable man was pitched at a high level of generality. Adherence
of the law to this level of generality could effectively keep the judges
from reviewing jury verdicts on the facts developed at trial, for the
judges did not need to decide, as a matter of law, whether certain
conduct was negligent. All the judges needed to decide was whether
the jury could reasonably find that the conduct was not that of the
ordinary reasonable man. Thus, the development of the ordinary
reasonable man standard blunted the threat that the eighteenth-
century development of procedures for reviewing jury verdicts would
ultimately reduce the law of torts to a multitude of specific legal rules
of conduct. At the same time, of course, that standard helped
maintain the primacy of the jury in determining whether the defen-
dant's conduct was wrongful.8
The continued primacy of the jury in applying the seemingly
open-ended negligence standard poses a challenge for anyone
attempting to describe accurately the institutional practices employed
in determining negligence liability. For a thorough understanding of
those practices, we need to know: (1) how judges convey the meaning
of the negligence standard to juries in jury instructions, (2) how juries
6. Id. at 296-313.
7. Id. at 397.
8. See generally Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the
Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 351-64 (1990) [hereinafter Kelley, Who
Decides?].
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understand those instructions, and (3) how juries apply those
instructions to the facts of individual cases.
The purpose of this Article is to provide part of the answer to the
question of how courts convey the meaning of the negligence
standard to juries. This partial answer comes from collecting,
categorizing, and reporting on the uniform or pattern jury instruc-
tions on negligence. This report, in turn, suggests some plausible but
tentative answers to the second and third questions-how do juries
understand the negligence instructions and how do they apply those
instructions to the facts of individual cases. Part I of the Article
reviews the debate over the meaning of the negligence standard. Part
II discusses the history of the movement toward pattern jury instruc-
tions. Part III analyzes the common themes and categorizations of
negligence instructions. Part IV considers the role of social science in
the jury's understanding of the negligence standard. Finally, Part V
discusses the relevance of answering how juries understand and apply
jury instructions and the recurring problems in formulating an
accurate descriptive theory of negligence liability.
The Article suggests that the states' pattern jury instructions are
fruitful subjects for further scholarly analysis. In order to encourage
others to use this resource, we have attached an appendix with a
current bibliography of the states' pattern or uniform jury instruc-
tions.
I. THE DEBATE OVER THE MEANING OF THE NEGLIGENCE
STANDARD
The meaning of the basic ordinary reasonable person standard is
not immediately evident. Nor is it clear why we still ask the jury to
apply that standard. We ordinarily ask juries to decide questions of
fact, but in negligence cases we ask the jury to determine what the
defendant did, and then make a qualitative judgment about that
action. Moreover, the fact that a jury is a one-shot decision maker,
disbanded after its verdict, means that another jury could reach a
different qualitative judgment about another defendant's virtually
identical conduct. What is it that justifies us, then, in leaving the
negligence decision to the jury?
The meaning of the negligence standard and the justification for
the jury's predominant role in applying that standard are closely
connected: we have to be able to say what we ask the jury to decide
before we can say why we ask the jury to decide that question.
[Vol. 77:587
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Historically, five different meanings have been assigned to the
negligence standard.
First, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. suggested that the ordinary
reasonable man standard asks the jury whether an ordinary, reason-
able man in the defendant's position would have foreseen danger to
others from the defendant's conduct under the known circumstances.9
The reason we ask the jury this, he said, is to consult the experience
of mankind as to the danger of certain conduct under certain known
circumstances.'() Once the judge knows what the experience of
mankind reveals about the danger of certain conduct under certain
known circumstances, then the judge should dispense with the jury
and reduce the negligence standard to a specific rule for that conduct
under those circumstances."
Second, advocates of the Carroll Towing Co. test12 have sug-
gested that the ordinary reasonable person standard asks a cost-
benefit question: whether the burden of taking precautions against a
foreseeable risk is less than the foreseeable probability times the
foreseeable gravity of threatened harm to others if the precautions
are not taken.13 If this is the meaning of the negligence standard, it is
not clear why we leave the question to the jury. Although, it might be
argued that the resulting cost-benefit judgment is an essentially
legislative judgment about how people ought to act under those
circumstances. Then, the jury, an ad hoc body representative of the
community, can appropriately make those judgments in our demo-
cratic society.
Third, some theorists suggest that the ordinary reasonable per-
son standard asks the jury to decide whether the defendant's conduct
under the circumstances was morally wrong according to the prevail-
9. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 87-88 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., Little. Brown 1963) (1881).
10. Id. at 98.
11. Id. at 98-99.
12. The Carroll Towing Co. test, also known as the Hand Formula, is a test for determining
negligence set out by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169
(2d Cir. 1947). The test focuses on the burden of taking precautions against the risks threatened
by the defendants' conduct, the probability of harm, and the gravity of the threatened harm.
Judge Hand stated: "Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic
terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether B < PL." ld. at 173. For the prior history
of the Carroll Towing Co. test. see Patrick J. Kelley. The Carroll Towing Company Case and the
Teaching of Tort Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 731, 742-50 (2001).
13. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85-107 (1987).
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ing community moral values. 14 The jury appropriately decides these
questions because the jury, a rough cross section of the community,
reflects in its composite judgment the prevailing community moral
values.
Fourth, Professor Heidi Li Feldman has recently published a
thoughtful article in this law review arguing that virtue ethics theory
explains the negligence liability standard and its application by the
jury.15 We ask the jury to reach a normative judgment about the
defendant's conduct by performing a thought experiment: place an
hypothesized person in the defendant's position, endow that person
with the virtues of reasonableness, prudence and carefulness, and
determine how that person would have acted.
Fifth, others have argued that the ordinary reasonable person
standard asks the jury whether the defendant breached a community
safety convention adopted to protect people in the plaintiff's position
from the risk of harm that eventuated in harm to the plaintiff.16 The
reason we ask the jury to answer that question is that the jury, as a
cross section of the community, can better determine as a matter of
fact whether there was a safety convention applicable under the
circumstances and whether the defendant breached that convention.
The different meanings assigned to the negligence standard, and
their related justifications for the jury's role in applying that standard,
represent different descriptive theories about the working of our
negligence liability system. There are two sets of facts relevant to
determining which of the five theories most accurately describes the
prevailing negligence liability systems in our fifty different states.
First, of course, are judicial opinions. What judges say about the
negligence standard in appellate or trial court opinions may tell us
precisely what the formal negligence standard is in that state and,
possibly, the meaning of that standard as understood by the judges.
Second are the instructions on the negligence standard that judges
give to juries in the different states.
14. Catharine Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2402-13 (1990) (elaborating a particularly sophisticated
version of this theory).
15. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law,
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000).
16. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 358-59 (1992); Kelley, Who Decides?,
supra note 8. at 343-90; Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "'Crisis": A Reassessment of
Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765. 781 (1987).
[Vol. 77:587
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The pattern or uniform jury instructions for each state provide
an opportunity to collapse these two factual inquiries into one. The
drafters of pattern jury instructions do not consider that their job is to
reform the law. Instead, they attempt to embody in the pattern
instructions an accurate and understandable statement of the law as it
has been set out by the state's highest appellate court. Because the
committees appointed to draft pattern jury instructions are comprised
of highly respected legal practitioners, such as trial lawyers, judges,
and the occasional practical-minded law professor, their collective
judgment about what the highest court in the state has determined to
be the basic standard of negligence is entitled to significant weight.
Moreover, insofar as trial judges use pattern jury instructions over
and over as a matter of course in defining for the jury fundamental
legal terms such as negligence, analysis of those instructions may
provide the best possible insight into the meaning of the negligence
standard that is conveyed to juries.
II. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In 1979, the American Judicature Society published a helpful
monograph by Robert Nieland that traced the history of the pattern
jury instruction movement. 7 Nieland identified two rounds of
pattern instruction adoption. The first round began with the influen-
tial California pattern instruction published by the Judges of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles in 1938, entitled The Book of
Approved Jury Instructions ("B.A.J.I.").18 The early success of this
work "encouraged the development of pattern jury instruction by
associations of the bench and bar in Washington, D.C., Florida,
Chicago, Nebraska, Colorado, and Utah over the next two dec-
ades."19
The next significant round of pattern instruction development
began in Illinois. Nieland explains the development as follows:
Shortly after its formation in 1954, the Illinois Judicial Conference
realized that pattern jury instructions might be used to correct an
instructional system described as 'nonfunctional.' Section 67 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act had made trial judges little more than
speaking agents of slanted, argumentative instructions. All were
drafted by counsel, the court having little more discretion than to
17. ROBERT G. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A
MODERN MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM (1979).
18. Id. at 6-7.
19. Id. at 8.
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pick and choose between tendered instructions .... This system
encouraged counsel to turn the instructions of the impartial judge
into partisan weapons. By slanting proposed instructions as
strongly as possible to one's case or by tendering an excessive num-
ber of instructions to confuse the jury, attorneys were able to turn
many a weak case to their favor.
While the more logical and direct way to correct this nonfunc-
tional system of instruction would have been through amendment
of the Civil Practice Act, the Judicial Conference was doubtless
aware of the failure of such attempts in the past. It therefore rec-
ommended the preparation of accurate and impartial pattern jury
instructions in an attempt to correct the graver abuses of the sys-
tem. Cognizant of the fact that a set of standardized instructions
prepared by the Chicago Bar Association in 1948 had received little
use, the Judicial Conference took the unusual step of requesting the
Supreme Court to carry out the project. This suggestion was ac-
cepted and a committee was appointed in 1956 to draft a set of pat-
tern jury instructions for civil cases. Upon the completion of the
committee's work the court adopted Rule 25-1, making use of the
pattern jury instructions mandatory when applicable to the facts of
a particular case .... The publicity surrounding the Illinois project
kindled interest in their development throughout the country. The
highest courts of fifteen states followed the Illinois example in or-
dering the preparation of pattern jury instructions. In six of these
states, the court further ordered that the instructions must be used
when applicable. In other states, responsibility for developing sets
of standardized instructions has been assumed by state bar associa-
tions, judicial conferences, judges associations, administrative of-
fices, trial and defense lawyers associations, law schools, judicial
colleges, and private individuals.0
The movement toward pattern jury instructions has continued
since Nieland wrote in 1979. Our research indicates that forty-eight
of the fifty states now have pattern or recommended jury instructions,
leaving only Texas21 and West Virginia22 without pattern instructions.
20. Id. at 8-10.
21. Although Texas has no pattern civil jury instructions, it does have a vigorously updated
civil jury instruction reporter entitled "Court's Charge Reporter. a New Trial-Level Resource
Service for Judges and Lawyers Preparing Charges in Civil Jury Cases," published monthly in
Austin, Texas by Court's Charge Reporter.
22. Jury instruction forms for Virginia cover both Virginia and West Virginia. The
combination of these two states is based on their shared history from colonial times to the civil
war. Though West Virginia ultimately split off from Virginia, their earliest case law was all
based in Virginia. Current jury instructions seem to be a carry-over from turn-of-the-century
books reporting on jury instructions that have been ruled on by appellate courts. See, e.g..
DEWIT C. BLASHFIELD. FORMS OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES,
INCLUDING APPROVED PRECEDENTS (1903): HENRY E. RANDALL. A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES WITH FORMS OF INSTRUCTIONS
APPROVED BY THE COURTS (1922). A treatise of this sort by Edward R. Branson went through
three editions from 1914 to 1936, culminating in a "Replacement" edition in 1962. A.H. REID.
THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES (2000) (1962
[Vol. 77:587
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A current bibliography of pattern instructions referenced in this
Article is set out in the Appendix. These pattern instructions
constitute a rich resource for studying what judges ordinarily tell
juries about the basic negligence standard. In the next Section, we
will review the pattern jury instructions for the forty-eight states on
the basic negligence standard.
III. PATTFERN NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS CATEGORIZED AND
ANALYZED
A. Instructions Defining Negligence
1. Ordinary Care and the Reasonably Careful Person
In most pattern jury instructions on negligence, negligence is
defined by using both the concept of ordinary care and the concept of
the conduct of a reasonably careful person or one of her close
relatives. The instructions combine these two concepts in a limited
number of ways. Some, such as the following Illinois instruction, tell
the jury that the defendant had a duty to exercise ordinary care for
the safety of the plaintiff: "It was the duty of the defendant, before
and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care for the safety
of [the plaintiff] [and] [the plaintiff's property]. That means it was the
duty of the defendant to be free from negligence." 23
Others, such as the following instruction from New York, define
negligence as the failure to use ordinary care or the lack of ordinary
care: "Negligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use that
degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used
under the same circumstances .... "24
replacement edition by William Samore).
23. 111. P.J.I. Civ. 10.04 (2000). For similar instructions that the defendant had the duty to
exercise ordinary care, see Ark. A.M.I. Civ. 305 (1999): Idaho I.D.J.l. Civ. 200 (1988): Mich.
S.J.I. Civ. 10.05 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001): N.C. P.I. Civ. 102.11 (1994 & Supp. 1999): N.M.
U.J.I. Civ. 13-604 (2001). See also Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.02 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000) (defining
duty to use reasonable care); Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-4 (1998) (defining duty to use reasonable care):
Or. U.C.J.I. Civ. 20.04 (1993) (defining duty to use reasonable care); R.I. M.J.I. Civ. 1001, 1003
(1998). Cf. Vt. P.J.I. Civ. 7.17 (1993): Wash. W.P.I. Civ. 10.04 (1989) (rejecting any instruction
in terms of duty).
24. N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:10 (3d ed. 2000). For similar instructions defining negligence as the
failure to exercise ordinary care or as the lack of ordinary care, see Ariz. R.A.J.I. Civ. Fault 1
(3d ed. 1997): Cal B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.10 (defining reasonable or ordinary care): Del. P.J.I. Civ. 5.1
(2000) (equating a reasonably prudent and careful person with an ordinarily prudent and careful
person): Ind. P.J.1. Civ. 5.01 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001) (defining reasonable or ordinary care):
20021 595
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Similar to this New York instruction, most states go on to define
ordinary care in terms of the conduct of the reasonably prudent
person25 or one of her close cousins: the reasonably careful person;26
the reasonably careful and prudent person;27 the ordinary, prudent
person;28 or the ordinary, careful person.29
States that deviate from this ordinary pattern do so in the fol-
lowing ways. Some states define negligence as the failure to use
reasonable care 30 and then go on to define reasonable care in terms of
the conduct of the reasonably prudent person or her relatives. 3' One
state, Kansas, defines ordinary care as the conduct of the ordinary
Kan. P.I.K. Civ. 103.01 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001); Me. M.J.I. Civ. 7-61 (4th ed. 2001); Md.
M.P.J.I. Civ. 19:1 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2001); Mich. 10.02 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001); Mo. A.J.I.
11.07 (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001); Nev. P.J.I. Civ. 4.03 (1986); Ohio J.1. Civ. 7.10 (2001); Okla.
U.J.I. Civ. 9.2 (2d ed. & Supp. 2002); Pa. S.J.I Civ. 3.01 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999);
S.D. P.J.I Civ. 10-01 (1995 & rev. 1997) (defining ordinary care or skill); Tenn. T.P.I. 3.05 (3d
ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000), Va. M.J.I. Civ. 4.000 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001); Wash. 10.01 (1989);
Wis. J.1. Civ. 1005 (2002); Wyo. P.J.I. Civ. 3.02 (1993). See also Alaska P.J.I. Civ. 3.03A (1999)
(defining negligence as the failure to use reasonable care): Georgia 3(a) (defining negligence as
failure to exercise ordinary diligence); Minn. J.I.G. Civ. 25.10 (4th ed. 1999); Miss. M.J.I. Civ.
15:1 (2001) (defining negligence as the failure to use reasonable care); Mont. P.J.I. Civ. 2.00
(1987 & Supp. 2001) (defining negligence as failure to exercise reasonable care): N.H. J.I. Civ.
6.1 (1994 & Supp. 2001) (defining reasonable care).
25. Ala. 28.01 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Alaska 3.03A (1999) (defining reasonable care);
Cal. 3.10 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Conn. 2-4 (1998) (defining reasonable care); N.Y. 2:10
(3d ed. 2000); Ohio 7.10 (2001) (stating reasonably cautious, careful or prudent as alternatives);
Pa. 3.01 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999); S.D. 10-01 (1995 & rev. 1997).
26. Ariz. Fault I (3d ed. 1997) (defining reasonable care); Ark. 303 (1999); Colo. J.l. Civ.
9.6 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000) (defining reasonable care); Idaho 210 (1988); I11. 10.01 (2000);
Iowa C.J.I. Civ. 700.2 (1987 & Supp. 2001); Mich. 10.02 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001); Miss. 15:1
(2001) (defining reasonable care); N.H. 6.1 (1994 & Supp. 2001) (defining reasonable care);
Okla. 9.2 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2002); Ohio 7.10 (2001) (defining ordinary care alternatively as
that of a reasonably cautious, careful, or prudent person); Or. 20.04 (1993) (equating a person of
ordinary prudence with a reasonably careful person); Tenn. 3.05 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000);
Wash. 10.01 (1989).
27. Del. 5.1 (2000) (equating a reasonably prudent and careful person with an ordinarily
prudent and careful person); Ind. 5.01 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001) (defining reasonable or
ordinary care).
28. Ga. 23(C)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1997) (defining ordinary diligence); Or. 20.04 (1993)
(defining reasonable care); R.I. 1003 (1998) (defining due care); Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.2 (1993)
(defining reasonable care).
29. Me. 7-61 (4th ed. 2001); Wyo. 3.02 (1993) (stating ordinary care as the degree of care
which should be reasonably expected of the ordinary careful person under the same or similar
circumstances).
30. See Alaska 3.03A (1999); Conn. 2-4 (1998) (duty to use reasonable care); Minn. 25.10
(4th ed. 1999); Miss. 15:1 (2001); Mont. 2.00 (1987 & Supp. 2001); N.H. 6.1 (1994 & Supp. 2001);
Or. 20.04 (1993) (defining duty to use reasonable care).
31. Alaska 3.03A (1999) (reasonably prudent person); Ariz. Fault 1 (3d ed. 1997) (defining
reasonably careful person); Colo. 9.6 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000); Conn. 2-4 (1998) (reasonably
prudent person): Miss. 15:1 (2001) (reasonably careful person); N.H. 6.1 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
(reasonably careful person); Or. 20.04 (1993) (defining ordinary prudent person).
[Vol. 77:587
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person.32 Several define ordinary care as the conduct of the reason-
able person. 33 A few dispense with the notions of ordinary or
reasonable care altogether, defining negligence in terms of the
conduct of the reasonably careful person 34 or the reasonable person.35
A few jurisdictions follow the ordinary pattern in all respects
except in substituting the adverb ordinarily for the adjective ordinary.
Thus, we see ordinary care defined as the conduct of an ordinarily
careful person 36 or an ordinarily prudent person. 37 This change from
the usual pattern instruction language seems unfortunate. An
ordinary, careful person is an ordinary person who is careful. An
ordinarily careful person, on the other hand, is not necessarily an
ordinary person, but is a person who is only ordinarily careful;
sometimes, then, this person may not be careful at all. The formula-
tion of the standard in terms of the ordinarily prudent or ordinarily
careful person, then, invites the jury to commit what courts have
consistently condemned as error 38 -what one might call the "there
but for the grace of God go I" fallacy: the conclusion that since we all
at one time or another fail to follow known safety rules, a defendant
here should be excused for his momentary lapse.
2. Foreseeability in Negligence Instructions
Foreseeable harm to others plays a central role in two descriptive
theories of negligence liability. Under Holmes's theory, if the
experience of mankind has established that harm to others is a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act under the known
circumstances, then the defendant's conduct was negligent. Under
the modern risk-benefit theory of negligence liability, the defendant
is liable for conduct that poses an unreasonable, foreseeable risk of
harm to others, where a risk is unreasonable if the burden of taking
precautions to avoid a risk of harm to others is less than the foresee-
able probability multiplied by the foreseeable gravity of the threat-
32. Kan. 103.01 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001).
33. Md. 19:1 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2001); Minn. 25.10 (4th ed. 1999) (reasonable care); S.C.
P.J.I. Civ. 23-8 (1994 & Supp. 1995); Va. 4.000 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001).
34. Fla. S.J.I. Civ. 4.1 (2001); Neb. N.J.I. Civ. 3.02 (2d ed. 2001).
35. Haw. C.J.I. Civ. 6.1 (1999).
36. Mo. 11.02 (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001); Mont. 2.00 (1987 & Supp. 2001).
37. Ky. I.J. Civ. 14.01 (1989 & Supp. 2001); La. J.I. Civ. 3.01 (1994 & Supp. 2001): Mass. J.l.
Civ. 3.1 (1997 & Supp. 1999) (defining ordinarily reasonable, cautious, prudent individual).
38. For the leading article on this principle, see Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent?
Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 292, 303 n.44 (1988).
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ened harm. In order to test the plausibility of these two theories, we
must examine the use of foreseeability in the pattern negligence
instructions.
A number of pattern negligence instructions use foreseeable
danger, foreseeable harm, or cognate notions of apparent danger to
explain a longstanding negligence principle: that the degree of care
required of a defendant under the ordinary or reasonable care
standard depends on the magnitude of threatened danger under the
known circumstances.39 This is such a simple notion, necessarily
entailed in the standard of ordinary care itself, that the Idaho pattern
instructions recommend not giving such an instruction separately at
all.40
Pattern instructions in a few states tell the jury that a foreseeable
risk of harm to others from the defendant's conduct is a precondition
for any negligence liability. A New Hampshire instruction states:
"Thus, a person may not be found negligent if he or she could not
reasonably foresee that his/her conduct would result in an injury to
another. . . ."41 A New York instruction states in part: "A person is
only responsible for the results of his or her conduct if the risk of
injury is reasonably foreseeable."42 The New York instruction goes
on to define negligence in light of a reasonably foreseeable risk:
"There is negligence if a reasonably prudent person could foresee
injury as a result of his or her conduct, and acted unreasonably in the
light of what could be foreseen."43 Both California 44 and Hawaii45
follow this New York pattern, setting out a reasonably foreseeable
risk as a precondition to negligence liability and then defining
negligence as unreasonable conduct in the face of a foreseeable risk
of harm to others. Four states (Arkansas, New Mexico, Louisiana,
and Wisconsin) have pattern instructions that explain the negligence
standard itself in terms of unreasonable conduct in the face of
39. See Cal. 3.12, 3.41 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Colo. 9.5 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000);
La. 3.01 (2001): Md. 19:3 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2001); N.M. 13-1603 (2001); Ohio 7.15 (2001); Or.
20.04 (1993): Vt. 7.19 (1993) (stating that the duty of due care increases proportionately with the
foreseeable risks): Wis. 1020 (1989 & Supp. 2002).
40. Idaho 218 (1988).
41. N.H. 6.3 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
42. N.Y. 2:12 (3d ed. 2000) (first part of two-part test): see also Cal. 3.11 (8th ed. 1994 &
Supp. 2002) (first part of two-part test).
43. N.Y. 2:12 (3d ed. 2000).
44. Cal. 3.11 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
45. Haw. 6.2 (1999).
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foreseeable risk of harm.46 Unlike New York, Hawaii, and California,
however, these states do not set out a reasonably foreseeable risk of
harm as a precondition to negligence.
The Arkansas foreseeability instruction expands on the reasona-
bly careful person standard and is to be given when foreseeability is
an issue.47 It provides: "To constitute negligence an act must be one
from which a reasonably careful person would foresee such an
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act,
or to do it in a more careful manner." 48 The New Mexico pattern
negligence instruction uses both ordinary care and the reasonably
prudent person terminology, but joins them with the test of unrea-
sonable foreseeable risk of injury:
Negligence (of all persons) definition: The term 'negligence'
may relate either to an act or a failure to act.
An act, to be 'negligence,' must be one which a reasonably
prudent person would foresee as involving an unreasonable risk of
injury to [himself] [herself] or to another and which such a person,
in the exercise of ordinary care, would not do.
A failure to act, to be 'negligence,' must be a failure to do an
act which one is under a duty to do and which a reasonably prudent
person, in the exercise of ordinary care, would do in order to
prevent injury to [himself] [herself] or to another. .... 49
Ordinary care: Ordinary care is that care which a reasonably
prudent person would use in the conduct of that person's own af-
fairs. What constitutes 'ordinary care' varies with the nature of
what is being done.
As the risk of danger that should reasonably be foreseen in-
creases, the amount of care required also increases. In deciding
whether ordinary care has been used, the conduct in question must
be considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. 50
Like New Mexico, the two alternative Wisconsin negligence in-
structions use both ordinary care and the conduct of a reasonable
person or a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, together
with the notion of unreasonable foreseeable risk, to define negli-
gence:
"Negligence" means a failure to exercise ordinary care. "Ordi-
nary care" is that degree of care which the great mass of mankind,
or the ordinarily prudent man, exercises under like or similar cir-
46. Ark. 302 (1999): N.M. 13-1601 (2001): La. 3.01 (2001); Wis. 1001 (2002).
47. Ark. 302 (1999), note on use.
48. Ark. 302 (1999).
49. N.M. 13-1601 (2001).
50. N.M. 13-1603 (2001).
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cumstances. A peison fails to exercise ordinary care-or in other
words, is negligent-when, without intending to do harm, the per-
son does an act or omits to take a precaution under circumstances
in which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought rea-
sonably to foresee that such act or omission will subject the person
or property of another to an unreasonable risk of harm .... 51
Negligence-Defined: A person is negligent when (he) (she)
fails to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care is the care which a
reasonable person would use in similar circumstances. A person is
not using ordinary care and is negligent, if the person, without in-
tending to do harm, does something (or fails to do something) that
a reasonable person would recognize as creating an unreasonable
risk of injury or damage to a person or property.52
Of the states that mention unreasonable foreseeable risk in their
pattern negligence instructions, only Louisiana sets out a cost-benefit
test for determining whether the defendant's conduct is negligent in
light of that foreseeable risk, and this test is presented as optional:
The ordinarily prudent person will avoid creating an unreason-
able risk of harm. In determining whether the defendant breached
this standard, and created an unreasonable risk of harm, you may
weigh the likelihood that someone might have been injured and the
seriousness of that injury against the importance to society of what
the defendant was doing and the advisability of the way in which he
was doing it, under the circumstances. 53
The earlier part of the Louisiana negligence instruction, which is
not optional, defines negligence in terms of the care which we might
reasonably expect from an ordinarily prudent person under the same
or similar circumstances. 54
B. Related Instructions: The Context for the Basic Negligence
Instructions
The substantive instructions defining the standard of care in a
negligence action are not the only instructions given to the jury. The
judge gives the negligence definition to the jury as well. Ordinarily,
the judge will give three other instructions closely related to the
instructions defining negligence: (1) an instruction setting out the
elements of the prima facie case for recovery in a negligence action;55
51. Wis. 1001 (2002).
52. Wis. 1005 (2002).
53. La. 3.01 (2001).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Colorado Pattern Jury Instructions:
ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY-NO NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF
For the plaintiff, (name), to recover from the defendant, (name), on (his)(her)
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(2) an instruction identifying that part of the defendant's conduct that
the plaintiff claims was negligent;56 and (3) an instruction explaining
the verdict forms that the judge submits to the jury.5 7 In addition, the
claim of negligence, you must find that all of the following have been proved... : [1] The
plaintiff had (injuries) (damages) (losses), [2] The defendant was negligent: and [3] The
defendant's negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's (injuries) (damages) (losses). If you
find that any one or more of these (number) statements has not been proved, then your
verdict must be for the defendant.
On the other hand, if you find that all of these (number) statements have been
proved, (then your verdict must be for the plaintiff) (then you must consider the
defendant's affirmative defense(s) of [insert any affirmative defense that would be a
complete defense to the plaintiff's claim]).
If you find that (this affirmative defense) ... has been proved by a preponderance
of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant.
However, if you find that (this affirmative defense) ... has not been proved, then
your verdict must be for the plaintiff.
Colo. 9.1 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000).
56. See, e.g., Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions:
ISSUES MADE BY THE PLEADINGS-NEGLIGENCE-ONE OR MORE
DEFENDANTS
[1] The plaintiff claims that he was injured and sustained damage, and that the
defendant[s] [was] [were] negligent in one or more of the following respects; [Set forth
in simple form without undue emphasis or repetition those allegations of the complaint
as to the negligence of the defendants which have not been withdrawn or ruled out by
the court and are supported by the evidence. If there is more than one defendant and
the allegations of negligence are different as between them, use a form such as:
'Defendant C, in . e.g., failing to keep a proper lookout.
'Defendant D, in _ _ ]
[2] The plaintiff further claims that one or more of the foregoing was a proximate
cause of his injuries.
[3] The defendant [Defendant C] [denies that he did any of the things claimed by
the plaintiff,] denies that he was negligent [in doing any of the things claimed by the
plaintiff] [and denies that any claimed act or omission on the part of the defendant was
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's claimed injuries].
[4] The defendant[s] claim[s] that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent [in one
or more of the following respects:]
[Set forth in simple form without undue emphasis or repetition those allegations of the
answer as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence which have not been withdrawn or
ruled out by the court and are supported by the evidence.]
[5] The defendant[s] further claim[s] that one or more of the foregoing was [a]
[the sole] proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
[6] The plaintiff [denies that he did any of the things claimed by defendant(s),]
denies that he was negligent [in doing any of the things claimed by defendant(s),] [to
the extent claimed by defendant(s),] [and denies that any claimed act or omission on
his part was a proximate cause of his claimed injuries].
[7] The defendant [Defendant C] also sets up the following affirmative defenses:
Defendant [Defendant C] claims [here set forth in simple form without undue
emphasis or repetition those affirmative defenses (except contributory negligence) in
the answer which have not been withdrawn or ruled out by the court and are
supported by the evidence].
[8] The plaintiff denies that [summarize affirmative defense].
[9] The defendant[s] further den[ies][y] that the plaintiff was injured or sustained
damages [to the extent claimed].
111. 20.01 (2000).
57. See, for example, the interrelated set of potential verdict forms in II1. 45.01 (2000).
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ordinary boilerplate instructions explaining to the jurors their role in
the case and directing them to use common sense in their delibera-
tionssx may become important in deciding whether the defendant
acted negligently.
In addition to these common boilerplate instructions, the court
may decide to give other instructions directly related to the negli-
gence standard, either qualifying or explaining the negligence
standard or cautioning the jury against misunderstanding that
standard. Looking at the pattern jury instructions from a number of
states identifies the tension between adding additional qualifying,
explanatory or cautionary instructions, or instead, instructing the jury
with only a bare-bones definition of negligence. We can see this
tension in the fact that the pattern instructions for some states have
certain additional instructions and others do not. More significantly,
perhaps, for many of the additional instructions (sudden emergency,
unavoidable accident, and the assumption that others will act properly)
some states have a pattern instruction and in other states the pattern
instruction drafters specifically recommend that no such instruction
be given.
For the sake of analysis we have sorted these additional negli-
gence instructions into three categories: (1) additional instructions
reaffirming the basic negligence standard as applied in certain
recurring situations; (2) additional clarifying instructions intended to
prevent common potential jury misunderstandings; and (3) additional
instructions relating the negligence standard to basic principles of
coordination when two or more parties are acting.
1. Additional Instructions Reaffirming the Basic Negligence
Standard
A number of states have pattern jury instructions that reaffirm
the basic negligence definition and explain its application in certain
recurring situations.
58. See, e.g., Illinois Preliminary Cautionary Instructions:
You will decide what facts have been proven. Facts may be proven by
evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Evidence consists
of the testimony of witnesses and of exhibits admitted by the court. You
should consider all the evidence without regard to which party produced it.
You may use common sense gained from your experiences in life in evaluating
what you see and hear during the trial.
Ill. 1.01 [3] (2000).
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(a) Sudden Emergency
At least twenty-three states have pattern jury instructions telling
the jury how the basic negligence standard applies in a sudden
emergency. 59 These instructions vary greatly in the detail with which
they explain the application of the negligence standard to an emer-
gency situation. One of the more detailed instructions is that of New
York:
Common Law Standard of Care-Emergency Situation:
A person faced with an emergency and who acts without op-
portunity to consider the alternatives is not negligent if (he, she)
acts as a reasonably prudent person would act in the same emer-
gency, even if it later appears that (he, she) did not make the safest
choice or exercise the best judgment. A mistake in judgment or
wrong choice of action is not negligence if the person is required to
act quickly because of danger. This rule applies where a person is
faced with a sudden condition, which could not have been reasona-
bly anticipated, provided that the person did not cause or contrib-
ute to the emergency by (his, her) own negligence.
If you find that (defendant, plaintiff) was faced with an emer-
gency and that (his, her) response to the emergency was that of a
reasonably prudent person, then you will conclude that (defendant,
plaintiff) was not negligent. If, however, you find that the situation
facing (defendant, plaintiff) was not sudden, or should reasonably
have been foreseen, or was created or contributed to by (defen-
dant's, plaintiff's) own negligence, or that the (defendant's, plain-
tiff's) conduct in response to the emergency was not that of a
reasonably prudent person, then you may find that (defendant,
plaintiff) was negligent. 60
59. Ala. 28.15 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Cal. 4.40 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002): Colo. 9.10
(4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000): Minn. 26.35 (4th ed. 1999): Nev. 4.14 (1986): N.H. 6.9 (1994 &
Supp. 2001); see also Ariz. Neg. 6 (3d ed. 1997): Conn. 2-28 (2000) (limiting instruction to auto
accidents); Ind. 5.33 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001); Me. 7-67 (4th ed. 2001) N.H. 6.10 (defining
instinctive action) (1994 & Supp. 2001); N.Y. 2:14 (3d ed. 2000): Ohio 7.17-7.18 (2001): Or.
20.08 (1993); Pa. 3.18 (1991); R.I. 1305 (1998); S.D. 12.03 (1995 & rev. 2000); Tenn. 3.08 (3d ed.
1997 & Supp. 2000): Vt. 7.33 (1993): Va. 7.000 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001); Wash. 12.02 (1989).
60. N.Y. 2:14 (3d ed. 2000): see also California Jury Instruction:
Duty of One in Imminent Peril:
A person who, without negligence on [his] [her] part, is suddenly and
unexpectedly confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence of, or the
appearance of, imminent danger to [himself] [herself] or to others, is not expected nor
required to use the same judgment and prudence that is required in the exercise of
ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate moments. [His] [her] duty is to exercise
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the same situation. If at
that moment [he] [she] does what appears to [him] [her] to be the best thing to do, and
if [his] [her] choice and manner of action are the same as might have been followed by
any ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions, [he] [she] does all the law
requires of [him] [her]. This is true even though in the light of after-events, it should
appear that a different course would have been better and safer.
Cal. 4.40 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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The Colorado instruction is much more concise:
Sudden Emergency: A person who, through no fault of his or
her own, is placed in a sudden emergency, is not chargeable with
negligence if the person exercises that degree of care which a rea-
sonably careful person would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances. 61
Other pattern instructions on emergency run the gamut
between the simplicity of the Colorado instruction and the de-
tail of the New York instruction. Tennessee and Alabama
have particularly thorough and precise instructions on sudden
emergency:
Sudden Emergency [Tennessee]: A person who is faced with a
sudden or unexpected emergency that calls for immediate action is
not expected to use the same accuracy of judgment as a person
acting under normal circumstances who has time to think and re-
flect before acting. A person faced with a sudden emergency is re-
quired to act as a reasonably careful person placed in a similar
position. A sudden emergency will not excuse the actions of a per-
son whose own negligence created the emergency.
If you find there was a sudden emergency that was not caused
by any fault of the person whose actions you are judging, you must
consider this factor in determining and comparing fault.62
Sudden Emergency [Alabama]: If a person, without fault of his
own, is faced with a sudden emergency, he is not to be held to the
same correctness of judgment and action as if he had time and op-
portunity to fully consider the situation, and the fact, if it be a fact,
that he does not choose the best or safest way of escaping peril or
preventing injury is not necessarily negligence, but the standard of
care required in an emergency situation is that care which a rea-
sonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances. 63
The pattern instructions for a number of states treat sudden
emergency as if it were an affirmative defense that the defendant has
the burden of establishing, although the standard of conduct applied
61. Colo. 9.10 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000); see also Or. 20.08 (1993):
EMERGENCY.
People who are suddenly placed in a position of peril through no negligence of
their own, and who are compelled to act without opportunity for reflection, are not
negligent if they make such a choice as a reasonably careful person placed in such a
position might make, even though they do not make the wisest choice.
Or. 20.08 (1993).
62. Tenn. 3.08 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
63. Ala. 28.15 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000).
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to the defendant's conduct in a sudden emergency remains the same
as the basic negligence standard.64 In at least three states 65 the
pattern jury instructions recommend against giving a sudden emer-
gency instruction on the grounds that it is redundant with the basic
negligence instructions.
(b) Intoxication
The pattern instructions for a number of states include an in-
struction on the application of the negligence standard to an intoxi-
cated party. These instructions tell the jury that an intoxicated
person is held to the standard of ordinary care exercised by a
reasonably prudent sober person and that intoxication is not an
excuse. 66 The Illinois pattern instruction is typical:
Intoxication as Negligence: Whether or not a person involved
in the occurrence was intoxicated at the time is a proper question
for the jury to consider together with other facts and circumstances
in evidence in determining whether or not he was [negligent] [or]
[contributorily negligent]. Intoxication is no excuse for failure to
act as a reasonably careful person would act. An intoxicated per-
son is held to the same standard of care as a sober person.
67
(c) Volunteers
The pattern instructions for a number of states include an in-
struction that a party who volunteers to help in a situation is never-
theless held to the regular negligence liability standard.68 A typical
instruction of this kind is that of Oklahoma:
Volunteer-Duty of Care: One who voluntarily assumes the care
of another who is not capable of caring for [himself/herself] is under a
64. See, e.g., Ohio 7.17 (2001); Pa. 3.18; S.D. 12-03 (1995 & rev. 2000); Vt. 7.33 (1993); see
also R.I. 1305(a) (1998) ("In this case [plaintiff/defendant] alleges he/she was faced with a
'sudden emergency' to explain why he/she acted the way he/she did just before the accident.");
Va. 7.000 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001) ("The defendant [plaintiff] contends he was confronted
with a sudden emergency.... If you believe from the evidence that the defendant [plaintiff,]
without negligence on his part, was confronted with a sudden emergency ... ").
65. See Fla. 4.1, drafter's cmt. (2001); Idaho 218 (1988); Ill. 12.02 (2000).
66. See Ala. 28.14 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Il1. 12.01 (2000); Ind. 5.31 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 2001); Iowa 700.2 (1987 & Supp. 2001); Ky. 14.02 (1989 & Supp. 2001); Minn. 26.25 (4th
ed. 1999); N.H. 6.7 (1994 & Supp. 2001); N.Y. 2:20 (3d ed. 2000); Ohio 7.19 (2001); Or. 22.01
(1993); Tenn. 4.11 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000); Wash. 12.01 (1989).
67. I11. 12.01 (2000).
68. See Ala. 28.17 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Colo. 9.8 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000); Miss.
15:16 (2001); N.H. 6.6 (1994 & Supp. 2001): N.Y. 2:24 (3d ed. 2000); Okla. 9.5 (2d ed. 1991 &
Supp. 2002). Contra Tenn. 4.30 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) (originating from Tennessee's Good
Samaritan Law finding liability for volunteers only if there is gross negligence).
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duty to act as a reasonably careful person would under similar
circumstances.69
(d) Act of God
The pattern instructions in a few states include an instruction
that defines an act of God and relates it to the application of the basic
negligence standard.70 A succinct instruction of this kind is that of
Mississippi:
Factors Relieving Liability-Acts of God: If you find from a
preponderance of the evidence in this case that Plaintiff's injury
was due directly and exclusively to natural causes, without human
intervention, which could not have been prevented by the exercise
of reasonable care and foresight, the occurrence is an act of God
for which the defendant is not liable. 71
Alabama seems to treat act of God as an affirmative defense,
although the standard of conduct applied is the regular negligence
standard.72
(e) Custom
The pattern jury instructions for a number of states include an
instruction on the relevance of custom to the application of the
negligence standard.7 3 A typical instruction is that of California:
Evidence of Custom in Relation to Ordinary Care: Evidence
as to whether a person conformed or did not conform to a custom
that had grown up in a given locality or business is relevant and
ought to be considered, but is not necessarily controlling on the
issue whether such person was negligent. That issue must be
determined by the standard of care that I have stated to you. 74
(f) Ordinary Care Varies with the Degree of Apparent Danger
The pattern instructions from a number of states include a
provision telling the jury that the care required by the negligence
standard varies according to the degree of apparent or foreseeable
69. Okla. 9.5 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2002).
70. See Ala. 28.18 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Miss. 15:7 (2001); N.C. 102.22 (1994 & Supp.
1999) (relating to proximate cause); Ohio 7.27 (2001) (relating to proximate cause).
71. Miss. 15:7 (2001).
72. Ala. 28.18 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000).
73. Cal. 3.16 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Minn. 26.15 (4th ed. 1999): N.Y. 2:16 (3d ed.
2000); Ohio 7.11 (2001): Wis. 1019 (2002); Utah 3.10 (1993): Wyo. 3.08 (1993).
74. Cal. 3.16 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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danger under the circumstances.75 Some of these provisions, like that
for Pennsylvania, are built into the basic definition of negligence:
Ordinary Care-Definition: Ordinary Care is the care a rea-
sonably careful person would use under the circumstances pre-
sented in this case. It is the duty of every person to use ordinary
care not only for his own safety and the protection of his property,
but also to avoid injury to others. What constitutes ordinary care
varies according to the particular circumstances and conditions ex-
isting then and there. The amount of care required by the law must
be in keeping with the degree of danger involved.76
Others, like that for Utah, convey this to the jury in a separate,
additional instruction:
Amount of Care Required Varies with Conditions: The
amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the
situation. Some situations require more caution because a person
of ordinary prudence would understand that more danger is in-
volved. In other situations, less care is expected, such as when the
risk of danger is lower or when the situation happens so suddenly
that a person of ordinary prudence would not appreciate the dan-
ger.
77
The drafters of the Idaho pattern instructions recommend
against an instruction of this kind.78 Pattern instructions from a
number of states include a closely related instruction telling the jury
that a great deal of care is required when the defendant is engaged in
inherently dangerous or extremely dangerous conduct.79
2. Additional Instructions Intended to Prevent Common Potential
Misunderstandings
A number of pattern instructions seem intended to prevent
common misunderstandings about the negligence standard.
(a) Negligence Not a Pre-Determined Legal Rule
Jurors might believe, mistakenly, that negligence must be judged
based on a predetermined judicial rule. The pattern instructions from
a number of states include a provision that seems to attempt to block
75. See Cal. 3.12 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002): Conn. 2-4 (1998); Md. 19:3 (3d ed. 1993 &
Supp. 2001); N.M. 13-1603 (2001); Ohio 7.10 (2001); Or. 20.04 (1993); Pa. 3.02 (1981 & 3d Supp.
1997 & Supp. 1999); Utah 3.6 (1993): Wis. 1020 (1989 & Supp. 2002).
76. Pa. 3.02 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999).
77. Utah 3.6 (1993).
78. Idaho 218 (1988).
79. Cal. 3.41 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Colo. 9.5 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000): Ohio 7.15
(2001); Pa. 3.16 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999); Tenn. 4.21 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000);
Utah 3.8 (1993).
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that misunderstanding.0 Commonly, the provision tells the jury that
the law does not say how the negligence standard applies, rather that
it is for the jury to decide, based upon the facts in the case. A typical
provision is included in Michigan's basic definition of negligence:
Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care. Ordinary care
means the care a reasonably careful person would use. Therefore
by "negligence," I mean the failure to do something that a reasona-
bly careful person would do, or the doing of something that a rea-
sonably careful person would not do, under the circumstances that
you find existed in this case.
The law does not say what a reasonably careful person using
ordinary care would or would not do under such circumstances.
That is for you to decide.81
(b) Fact of Accident Does Not Establish Negligence
A juror might conclude that just because there was an accident
caused in part by the defendant's conduct, the defendant must have
been negligent. In cases where res ipsa loquitur is not an issue, of
course, that is not true. The pattern instructions in some states
include an instruction, to be given when res ipsa loquitur is not
applicable, telling the jury that they should not presume from the fact
of the accident that the defendant was "negligent."82 A typical
instruction of this kind is that of Iowa's "Accident Does Not
Constitute or Raise Presumption of Negligence," which states that
"[t]he mere fact an accident occurred or a party was injured does not
mean a party was [negligent] [at fault]."83
The drafters of the Idaho pattern instruction recommend against
giving an instruction like this.84
(c) Standard Not That of a Supercautious or Extraordinarily Careful
Person
A juror might believe that the legal standard of conduct in negli-
gence is higher than what we ordinarily expect of others in the
80. Ark. 302, 303 (1999); Idaho 210 (1988); I11. 10.01 (2000); Mich. 10.02 (2d ed. 1981 &
Supp. 2001); Okla. 9.2 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2002); Pa. 3.01 (1984).
81 Mich. 10.02 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001).
82. See Colo. 9:12 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000); Conn. 2-45 (1998); Del. 5.1, 5.4 (2000); Iowa
700.8 (1987 & Supp. 2001); Minn. 25.55 (4th ed. 1999); Miss. 15:14 (2001); N.M. 13-1616 (2001);
N.C. 102.35 (1994 & Supp. 1999); Or. 20.01 (1993); S.C. 23-19 (1994 & Supp. 1995); Utah 3.3
(1993); Va. 4.015 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001).
83. Iowa 700.8 (1987 & Supp. 2001).
84. Idaho 217 (1982).
[Vol. 77:587
WHA TJUDGES TELL JURIES ABOUT NEGLIGENCE
community. This mistake could be invited by the use of terms like
prudent, careful, cautious, and reasonable in the instructions that
describe the hypothesized person whose conduct sets the standard.
This mistake presumably is guarded against in the basic negligence
instructions themselves, which almost always qualify these virtue-
terms by the word reasonably, ordinary, or ordinarily, and usually use
the hypothesized person standard in conjunction with the term
ordinary care. Nevertheless, some states include in their pattern
instructions another provision specifically pointing out that the
hypothetical person is not an extraordinarily cautious or exception-
ally careful person.85 An example of this kind of provision is that of
Massachusetts, which includes the following sentence in its basic
instruction defining negligence:
You will notice that the standard is not the conduct of the most
careful person or of the least careful person, but rather the conduct
of an ordinarily reasonable, cautious, prudent person, faced with
the same situation and under the same circumstances as the person
whose conduct is being considered. 86
(d) Unavoidable Accident
To a legal historian, the term unavoidable accident raises anti-
quarian visions of the common law in the days when the forms of
action were the significant legal categories. Back then, inevitable
accident could be specially pleaded as a defense to a trespass action,
and the standard for determining inevitable accident was the
forerunner of our modern negligence standard.87 One might think
that the term unavoidable accident, reminiscent of the antiquated
inevitable accident, and substantially equivalent to the conclusion
that the defendant was not negligent, should have no place in modern
negligence instructions. In fact, the drafters of pattern instructions in
six states recommend that an unavoidable accident instruction not be
given.88 Nevertheless, the pattern instructions in at least five other
states include an instruction on unavoidable accident or on accident
85. Ala. 28.15 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Cal. 3.10 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Mass. 3.1
(1997 & Supp. 1999); Utah 3.2 (1993).
86. Mass. 3.1 (1997 & Supp. 1999).
87. For the origin and development of the inevitable accident defense in trespass, see
Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 135, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616). See also Gibbons v. Pepper, 91 Eng.
Rep. 922 (1695); Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850) (equating inevitable accident
case with lack of negligence); Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Den, 193 (N.Y. 1843) (equating
inevitable accident with lack of negligence).
88. Colo. 9.11 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000); Idaho 233 (1988); Ind. 5.37 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 2001); S.D. 12-01 (1995 & rev. 2000); Wash. 12.03 (1989); Wis. 1000 (1989 & Supp. 2002).
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simpliciter.89 Why? A look at these instructions suggests that their
purpose is to warn the jurors against a mistake invited by our two
different, but closely related, meanings for the word accident.
Under one meaning, an accident is a harm-producing occurrence
caused by human behavior in which none of the actors intended
harm. In this sense, harm caused by negligent conduct, which by
definition is not done with intent to cause harm, would always be the
result of an accident. Under the other meaning of accident, however,
something is not an accident if it could have been avoided by
appropriate conduct on the part of human actors. An accident or
unavoidable accident instruction, then, could tell the jurors that the
defendant is not freed from liability for negligence just because the
harm to the plaintiff was not intended by the defendant and was
therefore the result of an accident in the first sense. For the defen-
dant to escape liability, the accident must have been an unavoidable
accident that happened even though the defendant exercised ordinary
care under the circumstances.
Typically, however, the instructions are given in terms of an un-
avoidable accident, defined as an accident that could not have been
avoided by the use of due care. A typical example of this is the
unavoidable accident pattern instruction from Virginia: "An un-
avoidable accident is one which ordinary care and diligence could not
have prevented or one which occurred in the absence of negligence
by any party to this action."90
3. Additional Instructions Relating the Negligence Standard to
Recurring Coordination Questions
We coordinate our conduct with that of others based on certain
assumptions about how they will act and what their capacities are.
The pattern jury instructions of a number of states include references
to a number of these coordinating assumptions.
89. Ohio 7.29 (2001); S.C. 23-19 (1994 & Supp. 1995); Utah 3.4 (1993); Va. 4.018 (1998 repl.
ed. & Supp. 2001).
90. Va. 4.018 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001). The comment to this instruction includes this
caveat:
The Court has observed: 'It is only where there is a reasonable theory of the evidence
under which the parties involved may be held to have exercised due care,
notwithstanding that the accident occurred, that an unavoidable accident instruction is
proper.' Bickly v. Farmer, 215 Va. 484, 488, 211 S.E.2d 66, 70 (1975). The Court has
also stated: 'It is rarely permissible to give an unavoidable accident instruction in
automobile accident cases.' Chodorov v. Eley, 239 Va. 528, 531, 391 S.E.2d 68 (1990).
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(a) The Assumption That Others Will Act Properly
A number of state pattern jury instructions include an instruction
that a party may act based on the assumption that others will act with
reasonable care and/or follow the rules of law.91 Only the Alabama,
Arizona, and Oregon instructions92 are limited to the assumption that
others will obey the law. Most other states provide that one may
assume that others will obey the law and act with reasonable care.93
A typical example of these instructions is that of Nevada:
Right to Assume Others Will Exercise Due Care: A person
who, himself, is exercising ordinary care has a right to assume that
every other person will perform his duty under the law; and in the
absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise, it is not negli-
gence for such a person to fail to anticipate injury which can come
to him only from a violation of law or duty by another. 94
A number of other state pattern instructions include an instruc-
tion that a party may assume that others will act appropriately or with
reasonable care,95 until they have notice to the contrary. The drafters
of pattern instructions for Florida96 and Idaho97 recommend that no
such instructions be given.
(b) Assumption That Others Are Reasonably Intelligent and Have
Normal Sight and Hearing
A few states have a pattern jury instruction that tells the jury
that a party may assume that others are reasonably intelligent and
have normal sight and hearing.98 The instruction from California is
typical:
91. See Ala. 28.16 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Ariz. Neg. 4 (3d ed. 1997) (limiting
instruction to auto accidents); Cal. 3.13 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Conn. 2-25 (1998) (limiting
instruction to auto accidents); Del 5.3 (2000); Minn. 26.10 (4th ed. 1999); Miss. 15:15 (2001);
Mont. 2.04 (1987 & Supp. 2001); Nev. 4.03 (1986); N.H. 6.16 (1994 & Supp. 2001); Ohio 7.30(3)
(2001); Or. 20.06 (1993); S.D. 12-06, 12-06A (1995); Tenn. 3.05 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000); Utah
3.12 (1993); Wash. 12.07 (1989).
92. Ala. 28.16 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000); Ariz. Neg. 4 (3d ed. 1997); Or. 20.06 (1993)
("Every person has a right to assume that others will obey the law, unless and until that person
knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know otherwise.")
93. See Cal. 3.13 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Conn. 2-25 (1998); Minn. 26.10 (4th ed.
1999); Mont. 2.04 (1987 & Supp. 2001); Nev. 4.03 (1986); Ohio 7.30(3) (2001); S.D. 12-06, 12-
06A (1995); Utah 3.12 (1993); Wash. 12.07 (1989).
94. Nev. 4.09 (1986).
95. Conn. 2-25 (1998) (limiting instruction to auto accidents); Del. 5.3 (2000); Miss. 36.15;
N.H. 6.16 (1994 & Supp. 2001); Tenn. 3.05 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
96. Fla. 4.1 cmt. 3 (2001).
97. Idaho 219 (1988).
98. Cal. 3.14 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. 2:11 (3d ed. 2000); Tenn. 3.06 (3d ed. 1997
& Supp. 2000); Utah 3.12 (1993).
2002]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Right to Assume Others' Normal Faculties: A person who is
exercising ordinary care has a right to assume that other persons
are ordinarily intelligent and possessed of normal sight and hearing,
in the absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise. 99
(c) Anticipate Conduct of Children
A number of state pattern jury instructions tell the jury
that one cannot assume that children will act with the care ex-
pected of an adult.'() The California instruction sets out the
idea clearly:
Care Required for Safety of Minor: Ordinarily it is necessary
to exercise greater caution for the protection and safety of a young
child than for an adult person who possesses normal physical and
mental faculties. One dealing with children must anticipate their
ordinary behavior. The fact that children usually do not exercise
the same degree of prudence for their own safety as adults, or that
they often are thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to exercise
a proportional vigilance and caution on those dealing with children,
and from whose conduct injury to a child might result.' 0'
The drafters of the Illinois pattern instructions recommend that
no such instruction be given.102
IV. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE JURY'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
The actual working of the negligence liability system depends on
the meaning of the negligence standard conveyed to the jury and their
willingness and capacity to apply that standard to the facts of the case.
Those who have studied the American jury system are virtually
unanimous in their answer to the question of the jury's willingness to
follow the substantive legal instructions given to them by the judge.103
Generally, jurors take their duties very seriously, and the judges and
lawyers in the trial process continually emphasize to the jurors the
significance and responsibilities of the jury. The question of the
meaning of the negligence standard conveyed by negligence instruc-
99. Cal. 3.14 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
100. See Ariz. Neg. 5 (3d ed. 1997); Cal. 3.38 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002); Conn. 2-6 (1998);
Mich. 10.07 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001); S.C. 23-18 (1994 & Supp. 1995); Utah 3.7 (1993).
101. Cal. 3.38 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
102. Ill. 10.07 (2000).
103. See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 245-51 (1986); REID
HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 227-40 (1983); cf. NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE
JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 319-37 (1995).
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tions and the capacity of the jury to apply that standard to the facts is
more problematic.
There are a number of recent, thoughtful, scholarly works on the
question of the jury's ability to understand and apply jury instruc-
tions.104 Two other major works report on experiments testing the
understandability of jury instructions-a path-breaking article by
Robert Charrow and Veda Charrow published in the Columbia Law
Review in 1979,105 and a how-to book by Amiran Elwork, Bruce D.
Sales and James J. Alfini published in 1982, giving a step-by-step
guide to drafting more understandable jury instructions.106 Both the
Charrow article and the Elwork book propose simplified, more
comprehensible versions of a basic negligence instruction. The
Charrows rewrote the alternative foreseeability instruction in the
California pattern instructions B.A.J.I. 3.11.107 Elwork and his co-
authors rewrote a basic negligence instruction, presumably originally
written in terms of the conduct of the ordinary careful person.108 The
104. The literature is reviewed in Note, Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1408, 1489-1513 (1997).
105. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
106. AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982).
107. The Charrows set out the then-current B.A.J.I. 3.11:
One test that is helpful in determining whether or not a person was negligent is to ask
and answer whether or not, if a person of ordinary prudence had been in the same
situation and possessed of the same knowledge, he would have foreseen or anticipated
that someone might have been injured by or as a result of his action or inaction. If
such a result from certain conduct would be foreseeable by a person of ordinary
prudence with like knowledge and in like situation, and if the conduct reasonably
could be avoided, then not to avoid it would be negligence.
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 105, at 1349. They then set out their rewritten form:
3.11 Modified
In order to decide whether or not the defendant was negligent, there is a test you
can use. Consider how a reasonably careful person would have acted in the same
situation. Specifically, in order to find the defendant negligent you would have to
answer "yes" to the following two questions:
1. Would a reasonably careful person have realized in advance that someone
might be injured as a result of a defendant's conduct?
And,
2. Could the reasonably careful person have avoided behaving as defendant did? If
your answer to both of these questions is yes, then the defendant is negligent. You can
use the same test in deciding whether the plaintiff was negligent.
Id.
Their research in the two different forms given to participants in comprehensibility
tests showed a marked increase in comprehensibility from the original to the
modified form. Id. at 1349-50.
108. Their reformulated instruction reads as follows:
STEP 2: UNDERSTAND WHAT NEGLIGENCE IS
Negligence is the failure to be as careful as we would expect an ordinary person to
be. For a person to be negligent, he/she must have done at least one of the following
two things:
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problem with these studies, as applied to the negligence standard, is
that they both just simplify the sentences containing the basic
defining language, while leaving the basic defining language unelabo-
rated. If those basic defining terms-foreseeability in the one case
and the conduct of the ordinary careful person in the other-are
subject to different interpretations and consequently different
applications, these simplifying rewrites may not make the ultimate
standard clear to the jury.109 The ultimate questions, not resolvable
by simple clarification studies, may be: what is the intended meaning
of the negligence standard; what is the meaning actually conveyed to
juries by the unreduced but simplified negligence instruction, and
how can the intended meaning be better conveyed?
Perhaps a recent, thoughtful book by Neal Feigensonlo might be
of help in tackling those questions. Feigenson's book reviews the
social science research on jury decision making in civil cases and then
attempts to enlarge our understanding by carefully analyzing selected
closing arguments to the jury in a number of accident cases, reviewing
what actual jurors have said about their deliberations in those and
other cases.
Based on these materials, Professor Feigenson concludes that
jurors consistently take their job very seriously and try to follow the
substantive instructions that the judge gives them. Reflecting his
social psychology perspective, Feigenson identifies three recurring
features of jury decision making: (1) a tendency to view the case as
melodrama, looking for a single locus of fault;"tl (2) application of
norm theory, the use of counterfactual thinking-focusing on which
actor failed to do what others within that culture usually do in that
1. He/she must have done something that an ordinary careful person would not
have done in the same situation.
2. Or, he/she must have not done something that an ordinary careful person
would have in the same situation.
This means that if a person acted similarly to the way an ordinary, careful person
would have acted, then he/she is not negligent.
ELWORK ET AL., supra note 106, at 166.
109. One proposal to encourage the use of clearer instructions is to make unclear
instructions a ground for appealing a jury verdict. AMIRAM ELWORK, ET AL., Toward
Understandable Jury Instructions, in IN THE JURY Box: CONTROVERSIES IN THE COURTROOM
161, 176 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987). This approach was adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 877-79 (Cal. 1991), which
rejected B.A.J.I. 3.75 based on its use of the term proximate cause, partly because the Charrow
study showed that the average juror could not understand it.
110. NEAL FEIGENSON. LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS (2000).
Ill. Id. at88-95.
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situation;112 and (3) a search for total justice-the just resolution of
the dispute in light of all the facts of the case, whether or not they are
legally relevant.113
Feigenson's relentless focus on the social psychology of the jury,
however, tends to draw the reader's attention away from the jury's
legally defined role; implying, perhaps, that juries decide based on
these psychological tendencies rather than the facts that they find to
be true and the law given to them by the judge.
Emblematic of this shift in focus, perhaps, is Feigenson's curious
inability to understand the jurors' explanation in the one case in his
study in which jurors told interviewers after trial that the judge's
instructions forced them to find for the plaintiff. That was Faverty v.
McDonald's Rests. of Or., Inc.,114 in which a teenage McDonald's
employee fell asleep at the wheel while driving home from McDon-
ald's after a late-night shift, his second shift in twenty-four hours.
The plaintiff was seriously injured when the sleepy teenager's car
slammed into his truck.
The instruction that the holdout jurors identified as crucial was
this. The judge told the jury that they had to decide: "[W]as the
defendant, McDonald's, negligent in working [the teenage employee]
more hours than was reasonable under the circumstances existing
when the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known that [he] would operate a motor vehicle and be a hazard
to himself and others?"' 5
Feigenson says that this instruction did not force the jury to find
for the plaintiff because they still had to determine whether McDon-
ald's conduct was unreasonable,'6 which, he says, they must have
done based on their melodramatic judgment -"simplifying, person-
alizing, and moralizing accidents by attributing responsibility to the
party who deviates from accepted cultural norms."1 7 This moralistic
judgment can be seen in the statement of the jury's foreman:
"McDonald's was working him ... more hours than they should have,
especially on a school night."118 But it is not clear that the jury would
have considered that judgment relevant to the decision of this case
112. Id. at 53-56.
113. Id. at 104-11.
114. 892 P.2d 703 (Or. App. 1995), discussed in FEIGENSON, supra note 110, at 152-69.
115. FEIGENSON, supra note 110. at 168.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 169.
118. Id. at 168-69.
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without the judge's instruction, which invited the jury to determine
whether McDonald's was negligent in working the teenage employee
more hours than was reasonable under the circumstances.]1 9 That
instruction took away from the jury the option of deciding that
McDonald's had not wronged the plaintiff because it had no duty to
third parties to make decisions about workers' shifts and hours so as
to protect those third parties from a sleepy worker driving home after
his shift. Once you accept that there is such a duty, it is difficult to
say that it was reasonable, in light of the risk to others from sleepy
employees driving home, to work a teenage employee on a late-night
shift, his second shift in twenty-four hours. The judicial recognition
of a duty here, and its embodiment in the jury instruction, therefore,
told the jury to transform work-shift rules, adopted to maintain
worker productivity and avoid overtime pay, into safety rules
intended to protect third parties threatened with harm by sleepy
employees driving home.
Understood in this way, of course, the Faverty case seems to il-
lustrate not the penchant of juries for melodramatic reasoning, but
the overwhelming significance of the judge's instructions and the
jury's understanding of those instructions as they apply to the facts of
the specific case. The Faverty case, relied on heavily by Feigenson,
thus suggests the importance of focusing on the relationship between
the basic negligence instructions given to the jury and the way the
jury decides the negligence question. Feigenson himself does not do
this systematically- Faverty is the only case in his sample for which
he gives part of the jury instructions. Moreover, Feigenson's review
of the literature suggests that there are no social science studies
focused on the meaning of the negligence standard conveyed to juries
by standard or variant negligence instructions. Clearly, this question
is ripe for further empirical research.
V. DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE AND PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
In the absence of definitive social science studies on the meaning
or meanings of negligence conveyed to jurors by standard negligence
instructions, any theorizing about the jury's role in applying the
negligence instructions must depend on straightforward traditional
interpretive analysis to determine the probable meaning or meanings
119. Id. at 168.
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the different pattern instructions on negligence would convey to a
jury.
Here, we run into a serious obstacle in our search for a single
descriptive theory of the negligence standard and the role of the jury
in applying it. Our review of the basic negligence instructions and
their immediate context in the pattern jury instructions of the
different states has shown us a range of similar but variant instruc-
tions in a wide range of qualifying contexts. How can we settle on a
single general descriptive theory that will accurately describe all these
varying particulars? Can the same theory that adequately accounts
for Virginia's definition of the negligence standard20 by reference to
the conduct of the reasonable person also adequately account for
Kansas's definition of the negligence standardl2l by reference to the
conduct of the ordinary person? Can the same theory that ade-
quately accounts for Idaho's definition of the negligence standard22
by reference to the conduct of the reasonably careful person also
adequately account for Missouri's definition of the negligence
standard in terms of the conduct of the ordinarily careful person?123
For that matter, can the descriptive theory that adequately explains
Idaho's basic definition of negligence, shorn of most qualifying or
reaffirming instructions, also adequately explain Mississippi's same
basic definition, qualified, elaborated, and reaffirmed heavily by
surrounding instructions?
There are three possible responses to the descriptive theory
problem posed by the multiple variations in pattern negligence
instructions. One could say that a single descriptive theory of these
variant instructions is impossible, and that the best we can do is to
attempt fifty different descriptive theories of the negligence law, one
for each state. An alternative response is to focus on what is common
to all of the pattern negligence instructions and elaborate a theory of
this commonality. But the only commonality among all these
negligence instructions is the device of defining the negligence
standard by reference to the conduct of a hypothesized person, whose
attributes are then differently and variously defined. The third
response is to recognize that the current different negligence instruc-
tions all derive ultimately from a common historical precedent, 24
120. Va. 4.000 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001).
121. Kan. 103.01 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001).
122. Idaho 210 (1988).
123. Mo. 11.02 (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001).
124. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
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which was itself explainable by a single descriptive theory. 25 In light
of that common history, one could then search for the central or focal
case 126 of these variant negligence instructions, develop a descriptive
theory of that case, and then explain the variations from that central
or focal case. Although this proposed methodology would not in
every case focus on the most common current standards, the central
or focal case, in this instance, would seem to be those negligence
instructions that are most consistent with the historical development
of the negligence standard. This would give us as the central case
those pattern negligence instructions that define negligence as the
failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances and that go
on to define ordinary care in terms of the conduct of the reasonably
careful or reasonably prudent person. The theoretical project would
then focus first on that central case and move from there to explain,
or account for, seemingly significant differences from that central
case.
Such a methodology, applied in drastically shortened form, sup-
ports the following tentative conclusions about the relationship
between the pattern jury instructions reviewed here and the five
descriptive theories of the negligence standard identified above.
First, there seems to be no support in the pattern negligence in-
structions for Holmes's theory of the negligence standard. Foresee-
ability is not mentioned in most of the negligence instructions, and
where it is, the foreseeability of danger from the defendant's conduct
simpliciter is not presented as the negligence standard. Without
Holmes's reductive positivist commitments, it is difficult to read the
ordinary pattern negligence instructions, emphasizing ordinary care
and the conduct of the reasonably careful or reasonably prudent
person or its variants, as requests that the jury determine only
whether foreseeable danger to others was threatened by the defen-
dant's conduct under the known circumstances.
Second, the cost-benefit test of negligence does not seem to be
the probable meaning of even those five pattern negligence instruc-
tions couched in terms of unreasonable foreseeable risk. To law
professors, of course, unreasonable foreseeable risk conjures up
Henry Taylor Terry's cost-benefit test for negligence, 27 embodied in
125. See Kelley, Who Decides?, supra note 8, at 351-64.
126. For an explanation of this focal or central case methodology, see JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3-22 (1980). For an application of this methodology to
tort law, see Kelley, Who Decides?, supra note 8.
127. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
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the first28 and second 129 Restatements and summarized in Learned
Hand's Carroll Towing Company test.130 But it seems to us that this
is not the meaning that would be conveyed to the jury. This is so for
a number of reasons.
None of the foreseeability instructions except that of Louisiana's
provisionl3l set out the detailed cost-benefit explanation of unreason-
able foreseeable risk by Terry, Hand, or the second Restatement.
Each instruction identifies foreseeability as the foresight of an
ordinary prudent person, and all but Wisconsin's instructions ask the
jury to determine, in addition to foreseeable harm from the defen-
dant's act, whether that conduct could reasonably be avoided, or
whether the act is one that a reasonably prudent person, in the
exercise of ordinary care, would not do.132 As thus qualified, the
foreseeable harm instructions would probably be understood by a
jury as one factor a reasonably prudent person would take into
account in deciding how to act. The meaning of the negligence
standard conveyed to the jury would likely still be the conduct of the
reasonably prudent person under the known circumstances. It seems
to us that a jury would interpret that standard not as an invitation to
engage in cost-benefit analysis, but as an invitation to determine how
reasonably careful people in their community would in fact act in
light of all the circumstances, including the foreseeable risk of harm
to others from the proposed conduct.
We are not sure how a jury would interpret the unreasonable
foreseeable risk language in the Wisconsin pattern negligence
instructions. In each of the two separate instructions in which the
phrase is used, there is reference to a hypothetical person, "a person
of ordinary intelligence and prudence"133 (which can only be used
with the consent of both parties), and a "reasonable person." 134
Moreover, each of those hypothetical persons is used to define
ordinary care. 135 It seems likely that a jury given either of these
instructions would interpret unreasonable foreseeable risk, too, in
light of the surrounding context pointing to the ordinary care
128. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 291, 292 (1934).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291,292 (1965).
130. United States v. Carroll Towing, Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
131. La. 3.01 (2001).
132. N.M. 13-1601 (2001).
133. Wis. 1001 (2002).
134. Wis. 1005 (2002).
135. Wis. 1001, 1005 (2002).
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exercised by a reasonable person or by persons of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence. This would, we think, point the jury to ordinary
safe practice in the community, not to an independent cost-benefit
analysis.
The optional provision in the Louisiana negligence instruction
does tell the jury to apply a cost-benefit test, 136 but that optional
provision is preceded and followed by mandatory provisions that
explain the negligence standard in terms of the conduct of the
ordinarily prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.
Of the five descriptive theories about the meaning of the negli-
gence standard, then, only three seem to be left as eligible theories
consistent with the pattern jury instructions. The descriptive theory
question boils down to this. Do these instructions ask the jury to
make a moral judgment about the defendant's conduct, based on the
community's prevailing moral values? Do they ask the jury to
hypothesize a person endowed with the virtues of prudence, caution,
and carefulness and determine in a thought experiment how that
virtuous person would act? Or, do they ask the jury to determine
whether the defendant wronged the plaintiff by failing to follow the
community's safety conventions?
There are good reasons to think these instructions do not ask the
jury to pass moral judgment on the defendant's conduct. Each of the
recurring critically important phrases in these pattern instructions,
ordinary care and the conduct of a reasonably prudent or a reasonably
careful person, seem to refer to a preexisting standard. That standard
does not seem to be so much a moral as a social standard, based on
the actual conduct of one who exercises ordinary care for the safety
of others. This social, rather than moral, nature can be seen, as well,
by focusing on what these instructions do not contain. There is no
mention of fault, improper conduct, excuses, good or bad, right or
wrong. Except for duty there is none of the language here that we
ordinarily associate with moral or ethical judgment. And the
language of duty is consistent with the fifth descriptive theory of the
negligence standard. If negligence liability is imposed to redress a
private wrong, defined by referring to the norms of the community, it
seems only natural to characterize that wrong as breach of a duty by
the defendant to the plaintiff based on prejudicial, community-
defined obligations. In only one limited sense, then, do the negli-
136. La. 3.01 (2001).
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gence instructions seem to call on the jury to make a moral judgment
based on the community's values. That moral judgment is tightly
circumscribed. The instructions seem to call on the jury to determine
whether the defendant's conduct, which resulted in harm to the
plaintiff, was a private injustice to the plaintiff. So it is only in
relation to the community's standard of what conduct the defendant
owed to the plaintiff under the circumstances of the case that the jury
is called on to make a community moral judgment. That judgment is
not a free-floating moral judgment, but a precise determination of
whether, in light of the community's preexisting coordination
patterns, the plaintiff could reasonably have expected the defendant
to have acted differently in order to protect the plaintiff from harm.
A similar answer can be given to Professor Feldman's brilliant
virtue-ethics theory of the negligence standard as applied by the jury.
Professor Feldman persuasively points out the recurring use of virtue-
terms in the pattern jury instructions: careful, prudent and reason-
able.137 But in almost every case these terms are qualified when used
to describe the hypothesized person. The instructions talk about the
reasonably careful or reasonably prudent person; they talk of the
ordinarily careful or ordinarily prudent person; they talk about the
ordinary, prudent person or the ordinary, careful person. Moreover,
in most instructions the conduct of a hypothesized person is used to
elaborate on the standard of ordinary care. These recurring, persis-
tent qualifications of the virtue words suggest that the hypothesized
person is not used to get the jury to identify what the virtuously
prudent, careful or reasonable conduct would be under the circum-
stances. Instead, the instructions ask the jury to identify what would
be ordinary care under the circumstances-the conduct that the
plaintiff could reasonably expect of other members of the community
who, though not paragons of virtue simpliciter, can be expected to act
in reasonably careful or reasonably prudent ways. The only virtue
this fully endows the hypothesized person with is the virtue of justice:
the reasonably careful person exercising ordinary care under the
circumstances gives the plaintiff what is her due-the conduct she
could reasonably expect of an individual in the defendant's position,
consistent with that community's preexisting safety practices, norms,
conventions and associated expectations. To make that judgment,
sensibly enough, we do not hypothesize for the jury a just person, but
define for the jury, in a general way, how a just person would act
137. Feldman, supra note 15, at 1446-50.
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within a particular set of preexisting social conventions and expecta-
tions.
The arguments against the broadly defined moral judgment the-
sis, as well as the arguments against the virtue-ethics thesis, point in
the direction of the fifth explanation for the negligence standard. The
focal case negligence instructions use the term ordinary care and
define ordinary care in terms of the conduct of a reasonably careful
or reasonably prudent person. The language points the jury to
preexisting standards of conduct that the plaintiff could reasonably
expect from the defendant. The broader context of the negligence
instruction supports this interpretation as well. These instructions are
given to the jury in a case brought by a plaintiff who claims a
defendant wronged him. Ordinarily, claims of wrong invoke a
standard of right conduct, preexisting the wrongdoer's conduct, which
the defendant allegedly breached. The most persuasive explanation
of the negligence standard, and the jury's role in applying that
standard, identifies the source of that preexisting standard in the
safety conventions of the community and the associated expectations
of the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the states' pattern jury instructions explaining the
basic negligence standards suggests that pattern instructions are a
rich, largely untapped resource for legal scholars. The categorization
of the pattern negligence instructions revealed a variety of different
kinds of instructions. The most common instructions defined
negligence as the failure to exercise ordinary care and further defined
ordinary care as the conduct of a reasonably careful or reasonably
prudent person. Other formulations of the standard were adopted by
other pattern instruction drafters, giving us a wide range-from the
conduct of the ordinary person to the conduct of the reasonable
person, and various permutations in between. The only formulation
that did not show up in any of the pattern instructions was the
conduct of the ordinary, reasonable person, the long-time favorite of
torts scholars.
We suggested that legal scholars interested in the practical
working of the negligence liability system would do well to explore
how juries understand the different, basic negligence instructions and
how juries apply those different definitions to recurring fact situa-
tions.
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If a single descriptive theory of negligence can explain the differ-
ent and various particulars of the states' pattern negligence instruc-
tions, the most likely explanation is that the negligence instructions
ask the jury to determine whether the defendant breached a pre-
existing community safety convention intended for the protection of
people like the plaintiff. That too would explain why we ask the
jury-a cross section of the community-to decide questions of fact in
light of community-based negligence standards.

APPENDIX:
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF STATE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
NEGLIGENCE
ALABAMA
Title: Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author. Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions Committee.
Publication: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing.
Year. 1993, 2000.
Hereinafter cited as: Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000).
NEGLIGENCE -DEFINITION
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.00 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
Negligence is the failure to discharge or perform a legal duty owed to
the other party.
NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.01 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
Negligence means the failure to exercise (reasonable) (ordinary) care;
that is, such care as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under
the same or similar circumstances.
Therefore, "negligence" is the failure to do what a reasonably prudent
person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or, the
doing of something which a reasonably prudent person would not have done
under the same or similar circumstances.
DUTY OWED-NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.02 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
The duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff was to exercise reason-
able care not to injure or damage the plaintiff; that is, to exercise such care
as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances.
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.14 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
A person who voluntarily becomes intoxicated is required to exercise
the same degree of care as is required of a sober person under the same or
similar circumstances. It is proper for you to consider whether or not the
defendant was intoxicated, together with all other facts and circumstances, in
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determining whether or not the defendant was negligent at the time of the
occurrence.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.15 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
If a person, without fault of his own, is faced with a sudden emergency,
he is not to be held to the same correctness of judgment and action as if he
had time and opportunity to fully consider the situation, and the fact, if it be
a fact, that he does not choose the best or safest way of escaping peril or
preventing injury is not necessarily negligence, but the standard of care
required in an emergency situation is that care which a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.
ASSUMPTION OTHERS WILL OBEY LAW
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.16 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
Every person has the right to assume that other persons will obey the
law; and he has a right to proceed on such assumption until the contrary is
clearly evident to him or by the exercise of reasonable care should have been
clearly evident to him.
DUTY OWED BY VOLUNTEERS (GOOD SAMARITAN RULE)
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.17 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant
voluntarily attempted to do anything for the plaintiff as is alleged by the
plaintiff (such as assuming to care for the plaintiff's injuries), the defendant
owed to the plaintiff the duty to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY FOR ASSUMED DUTY
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.17(a) (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
One undertaking to supervise, watch, and care for another, such as a
minor, even though gratuitously, binds himself to exercise due care; that is
such care as a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances, and a negligent failure to discharge this duty renders
such person liable for all damages proximately resulting from such negli-
gence.
ACT OF GOD
Ala. A.P.J.I. Civ. 28.18 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)
As a matter of defense, it is contended that the injuries (and damages)
complained of were caused by an "act of God" and without the fault or
negligence of the defendant.
An "act of God" is a cause which no human prudence or power could
prevent or avert; and, the defendant would not be liable if, the injuries (and
damages) complained of were caused by an "act of God."
The term "act of God" means: An unusual and extraordinary manifes-
tation of the forces of nature that could not under normal conditions have
been anticipated or expected; and, it applies only to events in nature so
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extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and other conditions in
the particular locality would afford no reasonable warning of them.
Manifestations of the forces of nature which may reasonably be ex-
pected, whether of frequent or infrequent occurrence, must be taken into
consideration by reasonable persons; and,
If the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable foresight and prudence,
could have foreseen and guarded against (the flooding, cyclone, windstorm,
or other, as the case may be), and the natural consequences thereof, and
failed to do so, the defendant would be liable for the injuries (and damages)
proximately resulting therefrom, even though the forces of nature were the
immediate cause of such injuries (and damages).
In other words, if the defendant was negligent by reason of (his) (her)
(its) failure to exercise reasonable foresight and prudence, the defendant
would be liable even though the occurrence of nature combined and con-
curred to proximately cause the injuries (and damages) complained of by the
plaintiff.
ALASKA
Title: Alaska Civil Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author: Alaska Supreme Court, Civil Pattern Jury Instructions Com-
mittee.
Publication: Alaska Court System.
Year. 1999.
Hereinafter cited as: Alaska P.J.I. Civ. (1999).
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Alaska P.J.I. Civ. 3.03A (1999)
I will now define negligence for you. Negligence is the failure to use
reasonable care. Reasonable care is that amount of care that a reasonably
prudent person would use under similar circumstances. Negligence may
consist of doing something which a reasonably prudent person would not do,
or it may consist of failing to do something which a reasonably prudent
person would do. A reasonably prudent person is not the exceptionally
cautious or skillful individual, but a person of reasonable and ordinary
carefulness.
In this case, you must decide whether (plaintiff), (name), (defendant),
(name), (both plaintiff and defendant) used reasonable care under the
circumstances.
ARIZONA
Title: Revised Arizona Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author. State Bar of Arizona.
Publication: State Bar of Arizona.
Year. 1997.
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Hereinafter cited as: Ariz. R.A.J.I. Civ. (3d ed. 1997).
DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE
Ariz. R.A.J.I. Civ. Fault 1 (3d ed. 1997)
Plaintiff claims that defendant was at fault. Fault is negligence that was
a cause of plaintiff's injury. Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.
Negligence may consist of action or inaction. Negligence is the failure to act
as a reasonably careful person would act under the circumstances.
ASSUME LAWS OBEYED-DUTY TO OBSERVE
Ariz. R.A.J.I. Civ. Negligence 4 (3d ed. 1997)
A driver is entitled to assume that another motorist will proceed in a
lawful manner and obey the laws of the road-unless it should become
apparent to that driver, acting as a reasonably careful person, that the other
motorist is not going to obey the laws of he road.
All drivers have a continuing duty to make that degree of observation
which a reasonably careful person would make under similar circumstances.
NEGLIGENCE OF A CHILD-DUTY OF ADULT TO ANTICI-
PATE BEHAVIOR OF CHILDREN
Ariz. R.A.J.I. Civ. Negligence 5 (3d ed. 1997)
A child is not to be held to the same standard of care as an adult.
A child who does not use the degree of care that is ordinarily exercised by
children of the same age, intelligence, knowledge, and experience under the
existing circumstances is negligent.
An adult must anticipate the ordinary behavior of children, and that
children might not anticipate the same degree of care for their own safety as
adults.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Ariz. R.A.J.I. Civ. Negligence 6 (3d ed. 1997)
In determining whether a person acted with reasonable care under the
circumstances, you may consider whether such conduct was affected by an
emergency.
An "emergency" is defined as a sudden and unexpected encounter with
a danger which is either real or reasonably seems to be real. If a person,
without negligence on his or her part, encountered such an emergency and
acted reasonably to avoid harm to self or others, you may find that the
person was not negligent. This is so even though, in hindsight, you feel that
under normal conditions some other or better course of conduct could and
should have been followed.
ARKANSAS
Title: Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.
Author. Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions.
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Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1999.
Hereinafter cited as: Ark. A.M.I. Civ. (1999).
NEGLIGENCE- DEFINITION
Ark. A.M.I. Civ. 301 (1999)
When I use the word "negligence" in these Instructions I mean the fail-
ure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the
doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence in this case. [It is for
you to decide how a reasonably careful person would act under those cir-
cumstances.] [To constitute negligence an act must be one from which a
reasonably careful person would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to
others as to cause him not to do the act, or to do it in a more careful man-
ner.]
ORDINARY CARE-DEFINITION
Ark. A.M.I. Civ. 303 (1999)
A failure to exercise ordinary care is negligence. When I use the words
"ordinary care," I mean the care a reasonably careful person would use
under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence in this case. It is
for you to decide how a reasonably careful person would act under those
circumstances.
DUTY TO USE ORDINARY CARE
Ark. A.M.I. Civ. 305 (1999)
A. It was the duty of - (defendant), before and at the time of
the occurrence, to use ordinary care for the safety of [ - ] [and] [his
property] [the property of __ ].
B. It was the duty of [all] [both] persons involved in the occurrence to
use ordinary care for their own safety and the safety of [others] [and their
property] [the property of others].
C. It was the duty of both __ and to use ordinary care for
their own safety and the safety of [others] [and their property] [the property
of others].
CALIFORNIA
Title: Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Civil, of the Su-
perior Court of Los Angeles County, California.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1994, 2002.
Hereinafter cited as: Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE-DEFINITIONS
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.10 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
Negligence is the doing of something which a reasonably prudent per-
son would not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent
person would do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evi-
dence.
It is the failure to use ordinary or reasonable care.
Ordinary or reasonable care is that care which persons of ordinary pru-
dence would use in order to avoid injury to themselves or others under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
[You will note that the person whose conduct we set up as a standard is
not the extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the exceptionally skillful one,
but a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence.]
A TEST FOR DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF NEGLI-
GENCE
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.11 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
One test that is helpful in determining whether or not a person was
negligent is to ask and answer the question whether or not, if a person of
ordinary prudence had been in the same situation and possessed of the same
knowledge, [he] [or] [she] would have foreseen or anticipated that someone
might have been injured by or as a result of [his] [or] [her] action or inaction.
If the answer to that question is "yes," and if the action or inaction reasona-
bly could have been avoided, then not to avoid it would be negligence.
AMOUNT OF CAUTION VARIES
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.12 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
The amount of caution required of a person in the exercise of ordinary
care depends upon the conditions that are apparent or that should be appar-
ent to a reasonably prudent person under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence.
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS' GOOD CONDUCT
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.13 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
Every person who is exercising ordinary care, has a right to assume that
every other person will perform [his] [her] duty [and obey the law], and in the
absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise, it is not negligence for
such a person to fail to anticipate an accident which can occur only as a
result of a violation of [law] [or] [duty] by another person.
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS' NORMAL FACULTIES
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.14 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
A person who is exercising ordinary care has a right to assume that
other persons are ordinarily intelligent and possessed of normal sight and
hearing, in the absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise.
EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM IN RELATION TO ORDINARY CARE
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.16 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
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Evidence as to whether a person conformed or did not conform to a
custom that had grown up in a given locality or business is relevant and
ought to be considered, but is not necessarily controlling on the issue
whether such person was negligent. That issue must be determined by the
standard of care that I have stated to you.
CARE REQUIRED FOR SAFETY OF MINOR
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.38 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
Ordinarily it is necessary to exercise greater caution for the protection
and safety of a young child than for an adult person who possesses normal
physical and mental faculties. One dealing with children must anticipate
their ordinary behavior. The fact that children usually do not exercise the
same degree of prudence for their own safety as adults, or that they often are
thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to exercise a proportional vigi-
lance and caution on those dealing with children, and from whose conduct
injury to a child might result.
SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF DUTY IN DANGEROUS ACTIV-
ITY
Cal. B.AJ.I. Civ. 3.41 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
Because of the great danger involved in the , a per-
son of ordinary prudence will exercise extreme caution when engaged in
such an activity.
DUTY OF ONE IN IMMINENT PERIL
Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 4.40 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002)
A person who, without negligence on [his] [her] part, is suddenly and
unexpectedly confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence
of, or the appearance of, imminent danger to [himself] [herself] or to others,
is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and prudence that is
required in the exercise of ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate
moments. [His] [Her] duty is to exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise in the same situation. If at that moment [he] [she]
does what appears to [him] [her] to be the best thing to do, and if [his] [her]
choice and manner of action are the same as might have been followed by
any ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions, [he] [she] does all
the law requires of [him] [her]. This is true even though in the light of after-
events, it should appear that a different course would have been better and
safer.
COLORADO
Title: Colorado Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author: Colorado Supreme Court Committee on Civil Jury Instruc-
tions.




Hereinafter cited as: Colo. J.I. Civ. (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000).
ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY-NO NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF
Colo. J.1. Civ. 9.1 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
For the plaintiff, (name), to recover from the defendant, (name), on
(his) (her) claim of negligence, you must find that all of the following have
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The plaintiff had (injuries) (damages) (losses);
2. The defendant was negligent; and
3. The defendant's negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's (injuries)
(damages) (losses).
If you find that any one or more of these (number) statements has not
been proved, then your verdict must be for the defendant.
On the other hand, if you find that all of these (number) statements
have been proved, (then your verdict must be for the plaintiff) (then you
must consider the defendant's affirmative defense(s) of [insert any affirma-
tive defense that would be a complete defense to plaintiffs claim]).
If you find that (this affirmative defense) (any one or more of these af-
firmative defenses) (has) (have) been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant.
However, if you find that (this affirmative defense) (none of these af-




Colo. J.1. Civ. 9.4 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
Negligence means a failure to do an act which a reasonably careful per-
son would do, or the doing of an act which a reasonably careful person
would not do, under the same or similar circumstances to protect (oneself
or) others from (bodily injury) (death) (property damage) (insert any other
appropriate description, e.g., "financial loss").
(Negligence may also mean assumption of risk. A person assumes the
risk of injury or damage if the person voluntarily or unreasonably exposes
him or herself to such injury or damage with knowledge or appreciation of
the danger and risk involved.)
NEGLIGENCE -DEFINED -INHERENTLY DANGEROUS AC-
TIVITIES
Colo. J.I. Civ. 9.5 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
One carrying on an inherently dangerous activity such as the (insert an
appropriate description, e.g., "transmission of electricity") must exercise the
highest possible degree of skill, care, caution, diligence and foresight with
regard to that activity, according to the best technical, mechanical and scien-
tific knowledge and methods which are practical and available at the time of
the claimed conduct which caused the claimed injury. The failure to do so is
negligence.
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REASONABLE CARE-DEFINED
Colo. J.1. Civ. 9.6 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
Reasonable care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful per-
son would use under the same or similar circumstances.
VOLUNTEER-DUTY OF CARE
Colo. J.I. Civ. 9.8 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
One who voluntarily assumes the care of an (injured) (ill) person is un-
der a duty to act as a reasonably careful person would under the same or
similar circumstances.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Colo. J.1. Civ. 9.10 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
A person who, through no fault of his or her own, is placed in a sudden
emergency, is not chargeable with negligence if the person exercises that
degree of care which a reasonably careful person would have exercised
under the same or similar circumstances.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Colo. J.1. Civ. 9.11 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
No instruction to be given.
HAPPENING OF ACCIDENT NOT PRESUMPTIVE NEGLI-
GENCE
Colo. J.1. Civ. 9.12 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2000)
The occurrence of an accident does not raise any presumption of negli-
gence on the part of either the plaintiff or the defendant.
CONNECTICUT
Title: Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. State of Connecticut Judicial Branch.
Publication: State of Connecticut Judicial Branch.
Year. 1998, 2000.
Hereinafter cited as: Conn. C.J.I. Civ. (1998).
NEGLIGENCE-DEFINITION
Conn. CJ.I. Civ. 2-1 (1998)
Negligence is the violation of a legal duty which one person owes to an-
other to care for the safety of that person or that person's property.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW
NEGLIGENCE
Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-2 (1998)
There are, for purposes of this case, two kinds of negligence: statutory
negligence and common law negligence. Statutory negligence is the failure
to conform one's conduct to a duty imposed by the legislature through the
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enactment of a statute. Common law negligence is a violation of the duty to
use reasonable care under the circumstances. A violation of either of these
duties is negligence.
COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Conn. CJ.I. Civ. 2-3 (1998)
Common law negligence is the failure to use reasonable care under the
circumstances. Reasonable care is the care that a reasonably prudent person
would use in the same circumstances.
REASONABLE CARE
Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-4 (1998)
In determining the care that a reasonably prudent person would use in
the same circumstances, you should consider all of the circumstances which
were known or should have been known to the defendant at the time of the
conduct in question. Whether care is reasonable depends upon the dangers
that a reasonable person would perceive in those circumstances. It is com-
mon sense that the more dangerous the circumstances, the greater the care
that ought to be exercised.
STANDARD OF CARE OF OTHERS IN RELATION TO CHIL-
DREN
Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-6 (1998)
A person is required to use greater care where the presence of children
may be reasonably expected. The question is whether a reasonably prudent
person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or
should have known, would anticipate that harm of the same general nature
as that which occurred here was likely to result. In answering this question,
you may take into account the tendency of children to disregard dangerous
conditions.
DUTY-FORESEEABILITY
Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-7 (1998)
A duty to use care exists when a reasonable person, knowing what the
defendant here either knew or should have known at the time of the chal-
lenged conduct, would foresee that harm of the same general nature as that
which occurred here was likely to result from that conduct. If harm of the
same general nature as that which occurred here was foreseeable, it does not
matter if the manner in which the harm that actually occurred was unusual,
bizarre or unforeseeable.
RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT OTHERS WILL OBEY THE LAW
Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-25 (1998)
In determining that [sic] is reasonable care under all of the circum-
stances, the conduct of the [defendant] should be judged from the viewpoint
of the reasonably prudent person. A driver of an automobile is entitled to
assume that other drivers will obey the law. The driver may thus assume
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that other drivers will obey all statutes governing the operation of motor
vehicles in this state and that they will use the care that a reasonably prudent
person would use in the same circumstances. The driver is allowed to make
this assumption until he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should
know that the assumption has become unwarranted.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-28 (2000)
As previously stated, negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable
care under all of the circumstances presented. One of the circumstances for
you to consider in this case is whether a sudden emergency situation existed.
The existence of a sudden emergency is a factor to be considered in the
evaluation of whether the defendant acted as a reasonable person under the
circumstances. An individual, choosing a course of action in an emergency,
is required to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person acting in such
an emergency.
You are to consider the evidence in this case to determine whether an
emergency situation existed. If you find that an emergency existed which
was not caused by the conduct of the defendant and that, as a result of the
emergency, the defendant chose a course of action which a reasonable per-
son would have done under the circumstances, then the defendant's conduct
would not be negligent. However, if you find that plaintiff's injuries resulted
from the conduct of the defendant and that either an emergency did not
exist, or the emergency situation was caused by the defendant's own con-
duct, or that the defendant, in the face of an emergency failed to act as a
reasonable person would have done under the circumstances, then the
defendant would be negligent.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Conn. C.J.I. Civ. 2-45 (1998)
The defendant claims that any injury suffered by the plaintiff was the
result of an unusual or unexpected event, and was not the result of either
party's negligence. If you find that the alleged injuries and/or losses in
question did not result from either the defendant's or plaintiff's negligence,
but were caused solely by some other happening, then the defendant is not
liable to the plaintiff.
DELAWARE
Title: Delaware Superior Court Civil Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author. Superior Court of Delaware.
Publication: Superior Court of Delaware.
Year. 2000.
Hereinafter cited as: Del. P.J.I. Civ. (2000).
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GENERAL NEGLIGENCE -NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Del. P.J.I. Civ. 5.1 (2000)
This case involves claims of negligence. Negligence is the lack of ordi-
nary care; that is, the absence of the kind of care a reasonably prudent and
careful person would exercise in similar circumstances. That standard is
your guide. If a person's conduct in a given circumstance doesn't measure
up to the conduct of an ordinarily prudent and careful person, then that
person was negligent. On the other hand, if the person's conduct does
measure up to the conduct of a reasonably prudent and careful person, the
person wasn't negligent.
[Add the following sentence if not using Jury Instr. No. 4.4, "Negligence
is Never Presumed.."] The mere fact that an accident occurred isn't enough
to establish negligence.
GENERAL NEGLIGENCE-NO DUTY TO ANTICIPATE NEG-
LIGENCE
Del. P.J.I. Civ. 5.3 (2000)
Nobody is required to anticipate someone else's negligence. [_A
driver / A person-] is allowed to assume that another [-_driver / person-.]
will not act negligently until [he/she] knows or should know that the other
person is acting or is about to act negligently. Therefore, a [__driver / per-
son-_] is required to act reasonably and prudently under the circumstances
of the particular situation.
GENERAL NEGLIGENCE-NO DUTY TO ANTICIPATE NEG-
LIGENCE
Del. P.J.I. Civ. 5.4 (2000)
Negligence is never presumed. It must be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence before [plaintiff's name] is entitled to recover. No presump-
tion that [defendant's name] was negligent arises from the mere fact that an
accident occurred.
FLORIDA
Title: Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases.
Author: Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in
Civil Cases.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing.
Year. 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Fla. S.J.I. Civ. (2001).
NEGLIGENCE
Fla. S.J.I. Civ. 4.1 (2001)
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that
degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under like
circumstances. Negligence may consist either in doing something that a
reasonably careful person would not do under like circumstances or in failing
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to do something that a reasonably careful person would do under like cir-
cumstances.
COMMENT
1. No inference of negligence from mere fact of accident. The commit-
tee recommends that no charge be given to the effect that "negli-
gence may not be inferred from the mere happening of an accident
alone" [Belden v. Lynch, 126 So. 2d 578, 581 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961)].
Such a charge is argumentative and negative.
2. Unavoidable accident. The committee recommends that no charge
be given on the subject of "unavoidable accident," this being a more
appropriate subject for argument by counsel.
3. Presumption of reasonable care. The committee recommends that
no charge be given to the effect that one is presumed to have exer-
cised reasonable care for his own safety or for the safety of others.
See Comment on charge 4.3.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Fla. S.J.I. Civ. 4.8 (2001)
COMMENT
The committee recommends that no charge be given on the subject of
sudden emergency. In the circumstances of an emergency, as in "ordinary
circumstances," the applicable standard of care is reasonable care under the
circumstances.
GEORGIA
Title: Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author. Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia.
Publication: Carl Vinson Institute of Government, The University of
Georgia.
Year 1991, 1997.
Hereinafter cited as: Ga. P.J.I. Civ. (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1997).
ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE (ORDINARY DILIGENCE); SLIGHT
NEGLIGENCE (EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE); GROSS
NEGLIGENCE (SLIGHT DILIGENCE); CHILDREN, DUE CARE
BY
Ga. P.J.I. Civ. 23(C) (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1997)
1. Ordinary Negligence (Ordinary Diligence)
Ordinary negligence means simply the absence of or the failure to use that
degree of care which is exercised by ordinary careful persons under the same
or similar circumstances.
2. Slight Negligence (Extraordinary Diligence)
In general, extraordinary diligence or care is that extreme care and caution
which very careful and thoughtful persons use under the same or similar
circumstances. (Applied to the preservation of property, extraordinary
diligence or care means that extreme care and caution which very careful
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and thoughtful persons use in securing and preserving their own property.)
The absence of such extraordinary diligence is termed slight negligence.
3. Gross Negligence (Slight Diligence)
In general, slight diligence or care is that degree of care which person of
common sense, however inattentive they may be, use under the same or
similar circumstances. (Applied to the preservation of property, slight
diligence or care means that degree of care which persons of common sense,
however inattentive they might be, take of their own property. The absence
of slight care is termed gross negligence.
4. Children, Due Care by
The term "due care," when used in reference to a child of tender years, is
such care as the child's mental and physical capabilities enable the child to
exercise in the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation under
investigation.
EMERGENCY
Ga. P.J.I. Civ. 23(M) (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1997)
One who is confronted with a sudden emergency which was not created
by one's own fault, and is without sufficient time to determine accurately and
with certainty the best thing to be done, is not held to the same accuracy of
judgment as would be required of that person if he/she had more time for
deliberation. The requirement is that the person act with ordinary care
under all particular facts and circumstances surrounding the situation.
HAWAII
Title: Hawaii Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii.
Publication: Hawaii State Judiciary.
Year. 1999.
Hereinafter cited as: Haw. C.J.I. Civ. (1999).
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Haw. C.J.I. Civ. 6.1 (1999)
Negligence is doing something which a reasonable person would not do
or failing to do something which a reasonable person would do. It is the
failure to use that care which a reasonable person would use to avoid injury
to himself, herself, or other people or damage to property.
In deciding whether a person was negligent, you must consider what
was done or not done under the circumstances as shown by the evidence in
this case.
FORESEEABILITY
Haw. C.J.I. Civ. 6.2 (1999)
In determining whether a person was negligent, it may help to ask
whether a reasonable person in the same situation would have foreseen or
anticipated that injury or damage could result from that person's action or
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inaction. If such a result would be foreseeable by a reasonable person and if
the conduct reasonably could be avoided, then not to avoid it would be
negligence.
IDAHO
Title: Idaho Jury Instructions.
Author. Idaho Pattern Jury Instruction Committee.
Publication: Idaho Law Foundation.
Year. 1982, 1988.
Hereinafter cited as: Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. (1982 or 1988).
DUTY TO USE ORDINARY CARE
Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. 200 (1988)
It was the duty of the defendant [both parties], before and at the time of
the occurrence, to use ordinary care for the safety of the plaintiff [both
themselves and each other] [and] [the plaintiff's property] [both their own
and each other's property].
NEGLIGENCE-DEFINITION
Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. 210 (1988)
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the fail-
ure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property or person.
The words "ordinary care" mean [sic] the care a reasonably careful person
would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasona-
bly careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful
person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the
evidence. [The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act
under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.]
PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE
Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. 214 (1982)
This law presumes that , in his conduct at the time of
and immediately preceding the accident, was exercising ordinary care. This
presumption is a form of evidence. It will support a finding in accord with
the presumption where there is no proof to the contrary.
FACT OF ACCIDENT ALONE
Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. 217 (1982)
The Committee recommends that no instruction that negligence may
not be presumed from the fact of an accident alone be given.
CARE COMMENSURATE WITH HAZARDS
Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. 218 (1988)
The Committee recommends that no general instructions relating the
amount of care to the hazards of the situation be given.
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ASSUMPTION AS TO CONDUCT OF OTHERS
Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. 219 (1988)
The Committee recommends that no instruction to the effect that a per-
son has a right to anticipate due care or obedience to the law on the part of
others be given.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Idaho I.D.J.I. Civ. 233 (1988)
The Committee recommends that no unavoidable accident instruction
be given.
ILLINOIS
Title: Illinois Civil Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author. Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in Civil
Cases.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 2000.
Hereinafter cited as: Ill. P.J.I. Civ. (2000).
PRELIMINARY CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS
Ill. P.J.I. Civ. 1.01 (2000)
[1] The law regarding this case is contained in the instructions I will give
to you. You must consider the Court's instructions as a whole, not picking
out some instructions and disregarding others.
[2] It is your duty to resolve this case by determining the facts and fol-
lowing the law given in the instructions. Your verdict must not be based
upon speculation, prejudice, or sympathy. [Each party, whether a
or (i.e., corporation, partnership, etc.) an indi-
vidual, should receive your same fair consideration.]
[3] You will decide what facts have been proven. Facts may be proven
by evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Evidence
consists of the testimony of witnesses and of exhibits admitted by the court.
You should consider all the evidence without regard to which party pro-
duced it. You may use common sense gained from your experiences in life
in evaluating what you see and hear during trial.
[4] You are the only judges of the credibility of the witnesses. You will
decide the weight to be given to the testimony of each of them. In evaluating
the credibility of a witness you may consider that witness' ability and oppor-
tunity to observe, memory, manner, interest, bias, qualifications, experience,
and any previous inconsistent statement or act by the witness concerning an
issue important to the case.
[5] An opening statement is what an attorney expects the evidence will
be. A closing argument is given at the conclusion of the case and is a sum-
mary of what an attorney contends the evidence has shown. If any statement
or argument of an attorney is not supported by the law or the evidence you
should disregard that statement.
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NEGLIGENCE-ADULT-DEFINITION
Ill. P.J.I. Civ. 10.01 (2000)
When I use the word negligence in these instructions, I mean the failure
to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of
something which a reasonably careful person would not do, under circum-
stances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a
reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for
you to decide.
ORDINARY CARE - ADULT- DEFINITION
Ill. P.J.1. Civ. 10.02 (2000)
When I use the words "ordinary care," I mean the care a reasonably
careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the
evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act
under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.
DUTY TO USE ORDINARY CARE-ADULT DEFENDANT
Ill. P.J.I. Civ. 10.04 (2000)
It was the duty of the defendant, before and at the time of the occur-
rence, to use ordinary care for the safety of [the plaintiff] [and] [the plain-
tiff's property]. That means it was the duty of the defendant to be free from
negligence.
CARE REQUIRED FOR SAFETY OF CHILD
111. P.J.1. Civ. 10.07 (2000)
The Committee recommends that no instruction on the care required
for the safety of a child be given.
INTOXICATION AS NEGLIGENCE
Ill. P.J.I. Civ. 12.01 (2000)
Whether or not a person involved in the occurrence was intoxicated at
the time is a proper question for the jury to consider together with other
facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether or not he was
[negligent] [or] [contributorily negligent]. Intoxication is no excuse for
failure to act as a reasonably careful person would act. An intoxicated
person is held to the same standard of care as a sober person.
DUTY OF ONE IN IMMINENT PERIL AND RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE PERSON CAUSING THE PERILOUS SITUATION
Ill. P.J.I. Civ. 12.02 (2000)
The Committee recommends that no instruction either on the duty of
one in imminent peril or the responsibility of the person causing the perilous
situation be given.
ISSUES MADE BY THE PLEADINGS-NEGLIGENCE-ONE
OR MORE DEFENDANTS
Ill. P.J.I. Civ. 20.01 (2000)
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[1] The plaintiff claims that he was injured and sustained damage, and
that the defendant[s] [was] [were] negligent in one or more of the following
respects:
[Set forth in simple form without undue emphasis or repetition those allega-
tions of the complaint as to the negligence of the defendants which have not
been withdrawn or ruled out by the court and are supported by the evidence.
If there is more than one defendant and the allegations of negligence are
different as between them, use a form such as:
"Defendant C, in " e.g., failing to keep a proper
lookout.
"Defendant D, in ."]
[2] The plaintiff further claims that one or more of the foregoing was a
proximate cause of his injuries.
[3] The defendant [Defendant C] [denies that he did any of the things
claimed by the plaintiff,] denies that he was negligent [in doing any of the
things claimed by the plaintiff] [and denies that any claimed act or omission
on the part of the defendant was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's claimed
injuries].
[4] The defendant[s] claim[s] that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent [in one or more of the following respects:] [Set forth in simple form
without undue emphasis or repetition those-allegations of the answer as to
the plaintiff's contributory negligence which have not been withdrawn or
ruled out by the court and are supported by the evidence.]
[5] The defendant[s] further claim[s] that one or more of the foregoing
was [a] [the sole] proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
[6] The plaintiff [denies that he did any of the things claimed by defen-
dant(s),] denies that he was negligent [in doing any of the things claimed by
defendant(s),] [to the extent claimed by defendant(s),] [and denies that any
claimed act or omission on his part was a proximate cause of his claimed
injuries].
[7] The defendant [Defendant C] also sets up the following affirmative
defenses:
Defendant [Defendant C] claims [here set forth in simple form without
undue emphasis or repetition those affirmative defenses (except contribu-
tory negligence) in the answer which have not been withdrawn or ruled out
by the court and are supported by the evidence].
[8] The plaintiff denies that [summarize affirmative defense].
[9] The defendant[s] further den[ies] [y] that the plaintiff was injured or
sustained damages [to the extent claimed].
INSTRUCTION ON USE OF VERDICT FORMS-NEGLIGENCE
ONLY-SINGLE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT-CAUSES OF
ACTION ACCRUING PRIOR TO 11125/86
Ill. PJ.I. Civ. 45.01 (2000)
When you retire to the jury room you will first select a foreperson. He
or she will preside during your deliberations. Your verdict must be unani-
mous. Forms of verdicts are supplied with these instructions. After you
have reached your verdict, fill in and sign the appropriate form of verdict
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and return it into court. Your verdict must be signed by each of you. You
should not write or mark upon this or any of the other instructions given to
you by the court.
If you find for [plaintiff's name] and against [defendant's name] and if
you further find that [plaintiff's name] was not contributorily negligent, then
you should use Verdict Form
If you find for [plaintiff's name] and against [defendant's name] and if
you further find that [plaintiff's name]'s injury was proximately caused by a
combination of [defendant's name]'s negligence and [plaintiff's name]'s
contributory negligence, then you should use Verdict Form _
If you find for [plaintiff's name] and against [defendant's name], then
you should use Verdict Form __ .
INDIANA
Title: Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author Indiana Judges Association.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing.
Year. 1989, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Ind. P.J.I. Civ. (2d ed.1989 & Supp. 2001).
NEGLIGENCE -DEFINITION
Ind. P.J.I. Civ. 5.01 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonably careful and prudent
person would do under the same or similar circumstances or the doing of
something that a reasonably careful and prudent person would not do under
the same or similar circumstances. In other words, negligence is the failure
to exercise reasonable or ordinary care.
REASONABLE OR ORDINARY CARE-DEFINITION
Ind. P.J.I. Civ. 5.03 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
Reasonable or ordinary care is such care as a reasonably careful and
ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circum-
stances.
INTOXICATION AS NEGLIGENCE
Ind. P..1. Civ. 5.31 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
The law holds an intoxicated person to the same standard of care as a
sober person. Intoxication is not an excuse for failure to act as a reasonably
careful person would act.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Ind. P.J.I. Civ. 5.33 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
A person confronted with a sudden emergency, not of [her][his] own
making and without sufficient time to deliberate, is not held to the same
accuracy of judgment as one who had time to deliberate. Accordingly, the
person is not negligent if [she][he] exercises such care as an ordinarily pru-
dent person would exercise when confronted with a similar emergency.
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If you find from the evidence that a sudden emergency confronted the
[plaintiff/defendant] and that [she][he] responded as an ordinarily prudent
person would have when faced with the same or similar emergency, then you
may not find the [plaintiff/defendant] negligent.
MERE ACCIDENT
Ind. P.J.I. Civ. 5.37 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
The Committee recommends that no "mere accident" or "unavoidable
accident" instruction be given in either traditional negligence actions or suits
involving comparative fault claims.
IOWA
Title: Iowa Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. Iowa State Bar Association's Board of Governors.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1987, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Iowa C.J.I. Civ. (1987 & Supp. 2001).
ORDINARY CARE - COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Iowa C.J.I. Civ. 700.2 (1987 & Supp. 2001)
"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care. Ordinary care is the
care which a reasonably careful person would use under similar circum-
stances. Negligence is doing something a reasonably careful person would
not do under similar circumstances, or failing to do something a reasonably
careful person would do under similar circumstances.
ACCIDENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE OR RAISE PRESUMP-
TION OF NEGLIGENCE
Iowa C.J.I. Civ. 700.8 (1987 & Supp. 2001)
The mere fact an accident occurred or a party was injured does not
mean a party was [negligent] [at fault].
KANSAS
Title: Pattern Instructions for Kansas.
Author: Kansas Judicial Council, Committee on Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions.
Publication: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing.
Year. 1997, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Kan. P.I.K. Civ. (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001).
NEGLIGENCE- DEFINED
Kan. P.I.K. Civ. 103.1 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001)
Negligence is the lack of ordinary care. It is the failure of a person to do
something that an ordinary person would do, or the act of a person in doing
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something that an ordinary person would not do, measured by all the cir-
cumstances then existing.
KENTUCKY
Title: Kentucky Instructions to Juries.
Author. John S. Palmore & Ronald W. Eades.
Publication: Anderson Publishing Co.
Year. 1989, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Ky. I.J. Civ. (4th ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001).
ORDINARY CARE; ADULTS GENERALLY
Ky. I.J. Civ. 14.01 (4th ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
"Ordinary care" means such care as the jury would expect an ordinarily
prudent person to exercise under similar circumstances.
SAME; ADULTS, WITH EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION
Ky. I.J. Civ. 14.02 (4th ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
"Ordinary care" means such care as the jury would expect an ordinarily
prudent person, if sober, to exercise under similar circumstances.
SAME; CONDUCT OF BUSINESS
Ky. I.J. Civ. 14.04 (4th ed. 1989 & Supp. 2001)
"Ordinary care" as applied to D means such care as the jury would ex-
pect an ordinarily prudent person engaged in the same type of business to
exercise under similar circumstances.
LOUISIANA
Title: Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Vol. 18: Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. H. Alston Johnson, III.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1994, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: La. J.I. Civ. (1994 & Supp. 2001).
NEGLIGENCE-GENERAL COMPOSITE CHARGE IN ORDI-
NARY CASE
La. J.I. Civ. 3.01 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
The law applicable to plaintiff's claim depends upon the nature of that
claim. This is a suit seeking damages for injury caused by the act of another.
Under our Civil Code such an act is called an offense or quasi-offense and
the suit is generally known as a tort suit. The basic law in Louisiana in this
type of suit is found in Article 2315 of our Civil Code:
"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it."
The word "fault" in that article is a key word. While the Civil Code
does not further define the word, it may perhaps best be explained by saying
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that it signifies that conduct which a person should not have engaged in that
is, that he has acted as he should not have acted, or that he has failed to do
something that he should have done. It is thus conduct below the standard
which the law applies to his activities.
It should be immediately obvious to you that the standard which we
apply to the defendant's conduct will vary according to the activity which he
is engaged in, and the circumstances surrounding that activity. As you are
well aware, in our complex society, persons are engaged in all kinds of
activities, and understandably, different standards may apply to those activi-
ties. Those standards may be set down by the legislature as statutes, or by
local officials as ordinances, or even by the courts themselves in instances in
which the law does not make a specific provision for the activity. In a few
minutes I will tell you the standards which apply to the defendant's conduct
in this particular suit, and you must accept the standards as I give them to
you. It will then be one of your tasks to determine if the plaintiff has proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has fallen below the
standard which the law expects of him in this particular instance. To put it
briefly, you will have to determine if the plaintiff has proved that the defen-
dant has engaged in substandard conduct and is thus, in legal terms, "at
fault." In this particular case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has
committed the kind of fault which the law calls "negligence."
But this is only one of the elements of plaintiff's case, and I have
previously told you that, in order to be successful, the plaintiff must establish
all the essential elements of his case. The other elements are the following:
(1) that the injury the plaintiff suffered was, in fact, caused by the
conduct of the defendant; and
(2) that there was actual damage to the plaintiff's person or his
property.
As to the requirement that plaintiff's injury be caused by defendant's
conduct, I do not mean that the law recognizes only one cause of any injury,
consisting of only one factor or thing, or the conduct of only one person. On
the contrary, many factors or things may operate at the same time, either
independently or together, to cause injury or damage. You should resolve
this question by deciding whether plaintiff would probably not have suffered
the claimed injuries in the absence of defendant's conduct. If plaintiff
probably would have suffered those injuries regardless of what the defendant
did, then you must conclude that the injuries were not caused by the
defendant, and render a verdict for that defendant. If, on the other hand,
plaintiff probably would not have suffered the claimed injuries in the
absence of defendant's conduct, then you must conclude that defendant's
conduct did play a part in plaintiff's injury and you must proceed to the next
element.
The second element of the plaintiff's case which you must consider is
whether the defendant's conduct was below the standard applicable to his
activities.
In this case, the basic standard applicable is a requirement that the
defendant exercise that degree of care which we might reasonably expect
from an ordinarily prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.
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You will see that this is a relative term: the care which we reasonably expect
from any ordinarily prudent person will vary according to the circumstances
facing him. Notice also that the conduct we set up as a standard is not that of
the extraordinarily cautious individual or the exceptionally skillful one, but
that of a person of ordinary prudence. While unusual caution or skill is to be
admired and encouraged, the law does not demand it as a standard of care in
this case.
[Optional paragraphs or sentence in brackets.]
[The ordinarily prudent person will avoid creating an unreasonable risk
of harm. In determining whether the defendant breached this standard, and
created an unreasonable risk of harm, you may weigh the likelihood that
someone might have been injured and the seriousness of that injury against
the importance to society of what the defendant was doing and the advis-
ability of the way in which he was doing it, under the circumstances.]
[In addition to this general standard, the following specific statutes are
applicable to the defendant's conduct:]
[Read those statutes which are found to be applicable.]
The ordinarily prudent person will normally obey the statutes which
apply to his conduct, but in exceptional circumstances, even a violation of
the statute may be reasonable. You must consider, in the light of all the
circumstances, whether an ordinarily prudent person in defendant's position
would be reasonable in violating the statute. If so, then the violation is not
sub-standard conduct. But if not, the violation is unreasonable, and there-
fore below the standard of care to which we hold the defendant in this case.
[Insert here any special-duty instructions.]
In summary, in order to find the defendant's conduct sub-standard, you
must find that as an ordinarily prudent person under all the circumstances
surrounding his conduct, the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that
as a result of his conduct, some such injury as the plaintiff suffered would
occur, and you must find also that he failed to exercise reasonable care to
avoid the injury. [You may find it helpful to phrase your inquiry this way:
"How would an ordinarily prudent person have acted or what precautions
would he have taken if faced with similar conditions or circumstances?"]
MAINE
Title: Maine Jury Instruction Manual.
Author. Donald G. Alexander.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing.
Year. 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Me. M.J.I. Civ. (4th ed. 2001).
NEGLIGENCE: ELEMENTS. INSTRUCTION
Me. M.J.I. Cir. 7-61 (4th ed. 2001)
In order to prove negligence, the plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence: first, that the defendant was negligent, and second, that
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the defendant's negligence was a [proximate] cause of the plaintiff's injury
and consequent damages.
Negligence is doing something that an ordinary, careful person would
not do, or failure to do something that an ordinary, careful person would do
in the same situation. It is, in other words, the failure to use ordinary care
under the circumstances considering all the evidence in the case.
EMERGENCY SITUATION
Me. MJ.I. Civ. 7-32 (4th ed. 2001)
The issue of negligence is considered differently if you find that an
emergency situation occurred.
A person confronted by an emergency he did not cause is not to be held
to the same degree of care as an ordinary person with time to consider his
actions. The test which you must apply is whether or not the person con-
fronted by an emergency he did not cause behaved as a reasonably prudent
person would have when confronted by the same or similar circumstances.
MARYLAND
Title: Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author. Maryland State Bar Association, Inc., Standing Commission on
Pattern Jury Instructions.
Publication: Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education
of Lawyers, Inc.
Year. 1993, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Md. M.P.J.I. Civ. (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2001).
DEFINITION
Md. M.P.J.I. Civ. 19:1 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2001)
Negligence is doing something that a person using ordinary care would
not do, or not doing something that a person using ordinary care would do.
Ordinary care means that caution, attention or skill a reasonable person
would use under similar circumstances.
FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES
Md. M.P.J.I. Civ. 19:3 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2001)
A reasonable person changes conduct according to the circumstances
and the danger that is known or should be known. Therefore, if the foresee-
able danger increases, a reasonable person acts more carefully.
MASSACHUSETTS
Title: Massachusetts Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author. John M. Greaney, et al.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing.
Year 1997, 1999.
Hereinafter cited as: Mass. J.I. Civ. (1997 & Supp. 1999).
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DUTY OF CARE-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Mass. J.1. Civ. 3.1 (1997 & Supp. 1999)
In this case, we are dealing with that area of the civil law known as the
law of negligence. It is a broad area of the law, and it has many applications.
Speaking generally, however, (and for the moment I am only speaking
generally), negligence means the failure to exercise that degree of care that
the ordinarily reasonable, cautious, prudent individual would have exercised
under all the facts and circumstances existing in some particular situation.
More simply stated, negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care
that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances.
Negligence may be doing something that the ordinarily reasonable, cau-
tious, prudent person would not have done under all the facts and circum-
stances existing at a particular time and place. It may also be the failure to
do something that the ordinarily reasonable, cautious, prudent person would
have done under all the facts and circumstances existing at a particular time
and place.
You will notice that the standard is not the conduct of the mot careful
person or of the least careful person, but rather the conduct of an ordinarily
reasonable, cautious, prudent person, faced with the same situation and
under the same circumstances as the person whose conduct is being consid-
ered.
When it is alleged, as it had been in this case, that a person has been
negligent, it becomes the duty of the jury to determine on the basis of the
evidence just what was the conduct of that person, and having done that, to
measure that conduct against the conduct of the ordinarily reasonable,
cautious, prudent person faced with the same facts and circumstances. If the
conduct of that person conforms to what would have been the conduct of the
ordinarily reasonable, cautious, prudent person faced with the same facts
and circumstances, then the jury should find that the person had not been
negligent. If, on the other hand, that person either did something that the
ordinarily reasonable, cautious, prudent person would not have done, or
failed to do something that the ordinarily reasonable, cautious, prudent
person would have done, then the jury would be warranted in finding that
the person had been negligent.
MICHIGAN
Title: Michigan Standard Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author. Michigan Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instruc-
tions.
Publication: The Institute for Continuing Legal Education.
Year. 1981, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Mich. S.J.I. Civ. (2d ed.1981 & Supp. 2001).
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NEGLIGENCE OF ADULT-DEFINITION
Mich. S.J.I. Civ. 10.02 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001)
Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care. Ordinary care means the
care a reasonably careful person would use. Therefore, by "negligence," I
mean the failure to do something that a reasonably careful person would do,
or the doing of something that a reasonably careful person would not do,
under the circumstances that you find existed in this case.
The law does not say what a reasonably careful person using ordinary
care would or would not do under such circumstances. That is for you to
decide.
DUTY TO USE ORDINARY CARE-ADULT DEFENDANT
Mich. S.J.I. Civ. 10.05 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001)
It was the duty of the defendant, in connection with this occurrence, to
use ordinary care for the safety of [the plaintiff/ and /plaintiffs property].
CONDUCT REQUIRED FOR SAFETY OF CHILD
Mich. S.J.I. Civ. 10.07 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001)
The law recognizes that children act upon childish instincts and im-
pulses. If you find the defendant knew or should have known that a child or
children were or were likely to be in the vicinity, then the defendant is re-
quired to exercise greater vigilance and this is a circumstance to be consid-
ered by you in determining whether reasonable care was used by the
defendant.
MINNESOTA
Title: Minnesota Jury Instruction Guides-Civil.
Author. Civil Jury Instruction Committee.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1999.
Hereinafter cited as: Minn. J.I.G. Civ. (4th ed. 1999).
NEGLIGENCE AND REASONABLE CARE-BASIC DEFINI-
TION
Minn. J.I.G. Civ. 25.10 (4th ed. 1999)
Definition of "reasonable care:"
Reasonable care is the same care a reasonable person would use in the same
or similar circumstances.
Definition of "negligence"
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.
Ask yourself what a reasonable person would have done in these circum-
stances.
Negligence occurs when a person:
Does something a reasonable person would not do; or
Fails to do something a reasonable person would do.
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RIGHT TO ASSUME ANOTHER'S GOOD CONDUCT
Minn. J.I.G. Civ. 26.10 (4th ed. 1999)
Right to assume reasonable care.
A person is entitled to assume that others will use reasonable care.
A person is also entitled to assume that others will obey the law.
However, a person is only entitled to assume that others will use reasonable
care or will obey the law until it reasonably appears that they will not.
EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM
Minn. J.I.G. Civ. 26.15 (4th ed. 1999)
Evidence of standards or custom:
Evidence of standards or custom is not conclusive. It is just one piece of
evidence.
1. You may consider an industrial (or professional) standard to decide
whether reasonable care was used.
2. You may consider what is usually done or customary in this industry
(or profession) to decide whether reasonable care was used.
Consider this evidence along with all the other evidence when you decide if
reasonable care was used.
CARE REQUIRED BY AN INTOXICATED PERSON
Minn. J.I.G. Civ. 26.25 (4th ed. 1999)
If a person was intoxicated, that does not necessarily prove he or she
was negligent. However, an intoxicated person is required to use the same
care required of a sober person.
REASONABLE CARE IN AN EMERGENCY- EMERGENCY
RULE
Minn. J.I.G. Civ. 26.35 (4th ed. 1999)
If there was an emergency that a person did not cause, that person is
not negligent if he or she acted in a way a reasonable person would have
acted. In deciding if he or she acted reasonably consider:
1. The circumstances of the emergency; and
2. What the person did or did not do.
FACT OF ACCIDENT ALONE-NO INFERENCE OF NEGLI-
GENCE
Minn. J.I.G. Civ. 25.55 (4th ed. 1999)
The fact that a (collision) (accident) has happened does not by itself
mean that someone was (negligent) (at fault).
MISSISSIPPI
Title: Mississippi Model Jury Instructions.
Author Mississippi Judicial College.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year: 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Miss. M.J.I. Civ. (2001).
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DEFINITION
Miss. M.J.I. Civ. 15:1 (2001)
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that
degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under like or
similar circumstances. Negligence may consist either in doing something
that a reasonably careful person would not do under like or similar circum-
stances, or in failing to do something that a reasonably careful person would
do under like or similar circumstances.
FACTORS RELIEVING LIABILITY-ACTS OF GOD
Miss. M.J.I. Civ. 15:7 (2001)
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that plain-
tiff's injury was due directly and exclusively to natural causes, without hu-
man intervention, which could not have been prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care and foresight, the occurrence is an act of God for which the
defendant is not liable.
NO INFERENCE FROM OCCURRENCE OF ACCIDENT
Miss. M.J.I. Civ. 15:14 (2001)
As a general rule, the mere fact that an [accident or injury] has
occurred is not, of itself, evidence of negligence on the part of anyone.
OTHER PARTY'S CONDUCT
Miss. MJ.I. Civ. 15:15 (2001)
In determining whether the [plaintiff or defendant] may
assume that the [defendant or plaintiff] would exercise ordinary
care and [state act], you should consider whether a reasonably
prudent person would assume that the _ [defendant or plaintiff]
would [state act] under the circumstances then and there exist-
ing.
DUTY OF VOLUNTEERS
Miss. M.J.I. Civ. 15:16 (2001)
Absent some special relationship, a person is under no legal obligation
to come to the aid of another in danger but one who voluntarily undertakes
to aid another must use reasonable care and prudence in giving such aid.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that:
1. Defendant volunteered to assist plaintiff; and
2. Defendant failed to use reasonable care by [describe al-
leged act]; and
3. Defendant's failure to use reasonable care was the sole proximate
cause or proximate contributing cause of plaintiff's injuries;
then your verdict shall be for the plaintiff.
However, if you believe that the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of
the above elements by a preponderance of the evidence in this case, then
your verdict shall be for the defendant.
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MISSOURI
Title: Missouri Approved Jury Instructions.
Author. Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Civil Jury Instructions.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1996, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Mo. A.J.I. Civ. (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001).
HIGHEST DEGREE OF CARE-DEFINITION
Mo. A.J.I. Civ. 11.01 (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001)
The phrase "highest degree of care" as used in this [these] instruction[s]
means that degree of care that a very careful and prudent person would use
under the same or similar circumstances.
NEGLIGENCE OF ADULT-DEFINITION
Mo. A.J.I. Civ. 11.02 (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001)
I. The term negligent or negligence as used in this [these] instructionis]
means the failure to use that degree of care that an ordinarily careful person
would use under the same or similar circumstances.
IL. The term "negligent" or "negligence" as used in this [these] instruc-
tion[s] means the failure to use that degree of care that a very careful person
would use under the same or similar circumstances.
ORDINARY CARE -DEFINITION
Mo. A.J.I. Civ. 11.05 (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001)
The phrase "ordinary care" as used in this [these] instruction[s] means
that degree of care that an ordinarily careful person would use under the
same or similar circumstances.
NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE COMBINED-DEFI-
NITIONS
Mo. A.J.I. Civ. 11.07 (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001)
The term "negligent" or "negligence" as used in this [these] instruc-
tion[s] means the failure to use ordinary care. The phrase "ordinary care"
means that degree of care that an ordinarily careful person would use under
the same or similar circumstances.
MONTANA
Title: Montana Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author. Montana Pattern Jury Instruction Committee.
Publication: State Bar of Montana.
Year 1987, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Mont. P.J.I. Civ. (1987 & Supp. 2001).
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Mont. PJ.I. Civ. 2.00 (1987 & Supp. 2001)
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Every person is responsible for injury to the person [or property] of an-
other, caused by his [or her] negligence.
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Negligence may consist
of action or inaction. A person is negligent if he fails to act as an ordinarily
careful person would act under the circumstances.
ASSUMPTION LAW IS OBEYED
Mont. P.J.I. Civ. 2.04 (1987 & Supp. 2001)
Every person has a right to assume that every other person will act with
reasonable care. In the absence of a reason to think otherwise, it is not
negligent for a person to fail to anticipate an injury which can result only
from another's violation of the law or failure to use reasonable care.
NEBRASKA
Title: Nebraska Jury Instructions
Author: Nebraska Supreme Court Committees on Civil and Criminal
Procedure.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Neb. N.J.l. Civ. (2d ed. 2001).
DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE
Neb. N.J.I. Civ. 3.02 (2d ed. 2001)
Negligence is doing something that a reasonably careful person would
not do under similar circumstances, or failing to do something that a rea-
sonably careful person would do under similar circumstances.
NEVADA
Title: Nevada Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author: State Bar of Nevada.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing (Michie).
Year: 1986.
Hereinafter cited as: Nev. J.I. Civ. (1986).
NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE-DEFINITIONS
Nev. J.I. Civ. 4.03 (1986)
Negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordi-
narily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances.
Ordinary care is that care which persons of ordinary prudence exercise
in the management of their own affairs in order to avoid injury to themselves
or to others.
[You will note that the person whose conduct we set up as a standard is
not the extraordinarily cautious individual, not the exceptionally skillful one,
but a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While exceptional skill is
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to be admired and encouraged, the law does not demand it as a general
standard of conduct.]
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS WILL EXERCISE DUE CARE
Nev. J.1. Civ. 4.09 (1986)
A person who, himself, is exercising ordinary care has a right to assume
that every other person will perform his duty under the law; and in the
absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise, it is not negligence for
such a person to fail to anticipate injury which can come to him only from a
violation of law or duty by another.
DUTY OF ONE IN IMMINENT PERIL
Nev. J.l. Civ. 4.14 (1986)
A person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unex-
pectedly confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence of, or
the appearance of, imminent danger to himself or to others, is not expected
and not required to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of
him in the exercise of ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate moments.
His duty is to exercise only the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise in the same situation. If at that moment he does what appears to
him to be the best thing to do, and if his choice and manner of action are the
same as might have been followed by any ordinarily prudent person under
the same conditions, he does all the law requires of him; although in the light
of afterevents, it should appear that a different course would have been
better and safer.
CONSENT OF PATIENT: WHEN IMPLIED PURSUANT TO NRS
41A.120
Nev. J.I. Civ. 6.9 (1986)
NRS 41A.120 sets forth one set of circumstances under which a patient
will be deemed to have impliedly consented to a medical or surgical proce-
dure. Such consent is to be implied where:
1. Pursuant to competent medical judgment the proposed medical or
surgical procedure is reasonably necessary and any delay in performing such
procedure could reasonably be expected to result in death, disfigurement,
impairment of faculties, or serious bodily harm; and
2. A person authorized to consent is not readily available.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Title: New Hampshire Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. Walter L. Murphy & Daniel C. Pope.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing.
Year. 1994, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: N.H. J.I. Civ. (1994 & Supp. 2001).
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LEGAL FAULT: NEGLIGENCE AND CAUSATION (GENERAL
NEGLIGENCE CASES), NEGLIGENCE
N.H. J.1. Civ. 6.1 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that
degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under the same
or similar circumstances.
The failure to use reasonable care may take the form of action or inac-
tion. That is, negligence may consist of either: doing something that an
ordinary, prudent person would not do under the same or similar circum-
stances; or, failing to do something that an ordinary, prudent person would
do under the same or similar circumstances.
[Foreseeability instruction to be used only if appropriate to the case]:
The duty to use reasonable care arises from the risk to others which could be
reasonably foreseen. Thus, a person may not be found negligent if he or she
could not reasonably foresee that his/her conduct would result in an injury to
another, or if his/her conduct was reasonable in light of the anticipated risks.
Also bear in mind that a person has no duty to anticipate the careless con-
duct of another.
FORESEEABILITY
N.H. J.. Civ. 6.3 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
The duty to use reasonable care arises from the risk to others which
could be reasonably foreseen. Thus, a person may not be found negligent if
he or she could not reasonably foresee that his/her conduct would result in
an injury to another, or if his/her conduct was reasonable in light of the
anticipated risks. Also bear in mind that a person has no duty to anticipate
the careless conduct of another.
VOLUNTEER--DUTY OF CARE
N.H. J.I. Civ. 6.6 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
Even if you find that the actions complained of were volunteered, it is
the legal obligation of one who volunteers to use reasonable care.
INTOXICATION AS AFFECTING NEGLIGENCE
N.H. J.I. Civ. 6.7 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
Intoxication doesn't excuse a person's obligation to exercise due care.
Even if you find a person was intoxicated, he/she is held to the same stan-
dard of care as a sober person, and his/her intoxication does not excuse
his/her conduct he/she otherwise fails to exercise reasonable care.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
N.H. J.I. Civ. 6.9 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
A sudden emergency is an event that calls for action without time for
the deliberate and thoughtful exercise of judgment.
If you find from the evidence that a party was confronted with a sudden
emergency not created by him/her and that he/she acted as a reasonably
careful person under those circumstances, that party has not violated the
standard of due care.
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INSTINCTIVE ACTION
N.H. J.1. Civ. 6.10 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
If the person is faced with a situation, created through no fault of
his/her own, which leaves him/her absolutely no time for thought, so that
he/she must act instinctively or by pure reflex, he/she may not be held legally
at fault for his/her actions.
NO DUTY TO ANTICIPATE NEGLIGENCE
N.H. J.1. Civ. 6.16 (1994 & Supp. 2001)
A person has no duty to anticipate the careless conduct of another.
NEW MEXICO
Title: New Mexico Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. New Mexico Supreme Court.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing (Michie).
Year. 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: N.M. U.J.I. Civ. (2001).
DUTY TO USE ORDINARY CARE
N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-604 (2001)
Every person has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of the
person and the property of others.
[Every person also has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the person's
own safety and the safety of [his] [her] property.]
NEGLIGENCE (OF ALL PERSONS); DEFINITIONS
N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1601 (2001)
The term "negligence" may relate either to an act or a failure to act.
An act, to be "negligence," must be one which a reasonably prudent
person would foresee as involving an unreasonable risk of injury to [himself]
[herself] or to another and which such a person, in the exercise of ordinary
care, would not do.
A failure to act, to be "negligence," must be a failure to do an act which
one is under a duty to do and which a reasonably prudent person, in the
exercise or ordinary care, would do in order to prevent injury to [himself]
[herself] or to another.
ORDINARY CARE
N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1603 (2001)
"Ordinary care" is that care which a reasonably prudent person would
use in the conduct of that person's own affairs. What constitutes ordinary
care varies with the nature of what is being done.
As the risk of danger that should reasonably be foreseen increases, the
amount of care required also increases. In deciding whether ordinary care
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has been used, the conduct in question must be considered in the light of all
the surrounding circumstances.
DUTY TO USE ORDINARY CARE
N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1604 (2001)
Every person has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of the
person and the property of others.
[Every person also has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the person's
own safety and the safety of [his] [her property.]
ACCIDENT ALONE NOT NEGLIGENCE
N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1616 (2001)
The mere happening of an accident is not evidence that any person was
negligent. Neither the fact that damages are claimed due the accident nor
the fact that this lawsuit was filed is evidence of any negligence on the part of
any person.
NEW YORK
Title: New York Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author. Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions Association of Supreme
Court Justices.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 2000.
Hereinafter cited as: N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. (3d ed. 2000).
COMMON LAW STANDARD OF CARE-NEGLIGENCE DE-
FINED- GENERALLY
N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:10 (3d ed. 2000)
Negligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use that degree of
care that a reasonably prudent person would have used under the same
circumstances. Negligence may arise from doing an act that a reasonably
prudent would not have done under the same circumstances, or, on the other
hand, from failing to do an act that a reasonably prudent person would have
done under the same circumstances.
COMMON LAW STANDARD OF CARE-NEGLIGENCE DE-
FINED- WHERE PLAINTIFF UNDER DISABILITY
N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:11 (3d ed. 2000)
There is evidence in this case that [state nature of plaintiffs disability].
If you find that plaintiff was under a disability that limited (her, his) ability
to protect (herself, himself) from injury and that defendant knew, or by the
use of reasonable care, should have known of that disability, then reasonable
care on defendant's part required that (she, he) use such care as would be
required for plaintiff's safety, in view of plaintiff's disability. Bear in mind,
however, that until defendant knew of plaintiff's disability or, by the use of
reasonable care, should have known of it, defendant was entitled to assume
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that plaintiff was not disabled and would be able to use due care for (her,
his) own safety and would do so.
COMMON LAW STANDARD OF
CARE - FORESEEABILITY -GENERALLY
N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:12 (3d ed. 2000)
Negligence requires both a reasonably foreseeable danger of injury to
another and conduct that is unreasonable in proportion to that danger. A
person is only responsible for the results of his or her conduct if the risk of
injury is reasonably foreseeable. The exact occurrence or exact injury does
not have to be foreseeable; but injury as a result of negligent conduct must
be not merely possible, but be probable.
There is negligence if a reasonably prudent person could foresee injury
as a result of his or her conduct, and acted unreasonably in the light of what
could be foreseen. On the other hand, there is no negligence if a reasonably
prudent person could not have foreseen any injury as a result of his or her
conduct, or acted reasonably in the light of what could have been foreseen.
[The charge should be related to the particular facts of the case. It is
recommended that this charge follow P.J.I. 2:10 where appropriate.]
COMMON LAW STANDARD OF CARE-EMERGENCY SITUA-
TION
N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:14 (3d ed. 2000)
A person faced with an emergency and who acts without opportunity to
consider the alternatives is not negligent if (he, she) acts as a reasonably
prudent person would act in the same emergency, even if it later appears that
(he, she) did not make the safest choice or exercise the best judgment. A
mistake in judgment or wrong choice of action is not negligence if the person
is required to act quickly because of danger. This rule applies where a
person is faced with a sudden condition, which could not have been reasona-
bly anticipated, provided that the person did not cause or contribute to the
emergency by (his, her) own negligence.
If you find that (defendant, plaintiff) was faced with an emergency and
that (his, her) response to the emergency was that of a reasonably prudent
person, then you will conclude that (defendant, plaintiff) was not negligent.
If, however, you find that the situation facing (defendant, plaintiff) was not
sudden, or should reasonably have been foreseen, or was created or contrib-
uted to by (defendant's, plaintiff's) own negligence, or that the (defendant's,
plaintiff's) conduct in response to the emergency was not that of a reasona-
bly prudent person, then you may find that (defendant, plaintiff) was negli-
gent.
COMMON LAW STANDARD OF CARE-CUSTOMARY BUSI-
NESS PRACTICES
N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:16 (3d ed. 2000)
You have heard evidence of the general customs and practice of others
who are in the same business or trade as that of defendant. This evidence is
to be considered by you in determining whether the conduct of defendant
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was reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant's conduct is not to be
considered unreasonable simply because someone else may have used a
better or safer practice. On the other hand, a general custom, use, or prac-
tice by those in the same business or trade may be considered some evidence
of what constituted reasonable conduct in that trade or business.
You must first decide, from the evidence presented in this case, whether
there is a general custom or practice in defendant's trade or business. If you
find that there is a custom or practice, you may take that general custom or
practice into account in considering the care used by defendant in this case.
However, a general custom or practice is not the only test; what you must
decide is whether, taking all the facts and circumstances into account, defen-
dant acted with reasonable care.
COMMON LAW STANDARD OF CARE-CARE REQUIRED OF
PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY-INTOXICATED PERSON
N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:20 (3d ed. 2000)
One who has disabled (himself, herself) by reason of intoxication is held
to the same standard of care that is required of a sober person. An intoxi-
cated person is one whose use of (an alcoholic beverage, drug) has impaired
(his, her) judgment and ability to act. It is a question of fact for you to
determine whether or not the defendant was intoxicated. If you find that
defendant was intoxicated, or that defendant's judgment and ability to act
were impaired by reason of intoxication, that fact may be considered by you
in determining whether or not the defendant used the care of a reasonably
prudent, sober person under the circumstances.
COMMON LAW STANDARD OF CARE-VOLUNTARILY AS-
SUMED DUTY
N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:24 (3d ed. 2000)
Defendant AB had no duty to come to CD's assistance. But once AB
voluntarily came to the assistance of CD, the law imposed on AB the duty of
using reasonable care in giving assistance and the duty to continue to do so if
it would appear to a reasonable person that discontinuing assistance would
expose CD to a new danger or a return to the same or a similar danger.
Reasonable care means the care that a reasonably prudent person
would have used under the same circumstances. If you find that AB acted
reasonably in giving assistance, or that discontinuing the assistance under the
circumstances of this case did not expose CD to a new danger or return CD
to the same or a similar danger you must find AB free from fault. If you find
that AB did not act reasonably in giving assistance, or that discontinuing
assistance exposed CD to a new danger, or the same or a similar danger, you
must find AB at fault, provided that you also find that AB's acts were a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury to CD.
NORTH CAROLINA
Title: North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases.
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Author: North Carolina Conference of Superior Court Judges, Commit-
tee on Pattern Jury Instructions.
Publication: North Carolina Conference of Superior Court Judges.
Year. 1983, 1994.
Hereinafter cited as: N.C. P.I. Civ. (1994).
NEGLIGENCE ISSUE-BURDEN OF PROOF
N.C. P.I. Civ. 102.10 (1994)
This (state number) issue reads:
"Was the plaintiff [injured] [damaged] by the negligence of the defendant?"
On this issue the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. This means that the
plaintiff must prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the defen-
dant was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's [injury] [damage].
NEGLIGENCE ISSUE-DEFINITION OF COMMON LAW NEG-
LIGENCE
N.C. P.I. Civ. 102.11 (1994)
Negligence refers to a person's failure to follow a duty of conduct im-
posed by law. Every person is under a duty to use ordinary care to protect
himself and others from [injury] [damage]. Ordinary care means that degree
of care which a reasonable and prudent person would use under the same or
similar circumstances to protect himself and others from [injury] [damage].
A person's failure to use ordinary care is negligence.
ACT OF GOD
N.C. P.I. Civ. 102.22 (1983)
The defendant contends that the plaintiff's [injury] [damage], (describe
the injury or damage), was caused by an Act of God, and that the defendant
is therefore not liable for such [injury] [damage].
An "Act of God" is an event caused solely by natural forces, without
any intervention from the acts of men. Such an event must not only be
caused by natural forces alone, but must also be so extraordinary that nei-
ther the history of the weather nor any other natural force where the event
took place, gave any reasonable warning that such an event might happen. It
is not enough that the event is rare or unusual, but it must be so far outside
the range of normal experience that a person of ordinary care would not
have anticipated or guarded against such an event.
The law provides that if the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's [in-
jury] [damage] is an Act of God, the plaintiff may recover nothing for that
[injury] [damage]. If, however, negligence of the defendant was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's [injury] [damage], even if an Act of God joined with
such negligence of the defendant in proximately causing the injury, then the
defendant would be liable for that [injury] [damage].
The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was negligent,
and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's [injury]
[damage], either alone or together with an Act of God.
2002]
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
PROXIMATE CAUSE-ACT OF GOD
N.C. P.I. Civ. 102.26 (1994)
An Act of God occurs only by violence of nature without the interfer-
ence of any human. It is a natural event resulting from physical causes alone.
Where the sole proximate cause of a person's [injury] [damage] is an
Act of God, that person may not recover anything for his [injury] [damage].
Where an Act of God joins with the negligent act of another in proximately
causing a person's (injury] [damage], that person may recover for his [injury]
[damage].
CONTENTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE
N.C. P.I. Civ. 102.35 (1994)
In this case, the plaintiff contends, and the defendant denies, that the
defendant was negligent in one or more of the following ways:
(Read all contentions of negligence supported by the evidence.)
The plaintiff further contends, and the defendant denies, that the
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's [injury]
[damage].
I instruct you that negligence is not to be presumed from the mere fact
of [injury] [damage].
(Give law as to each contention of negligence included above.)
OHIO
Title: Ohio Jury Instructions.
Author: Ohio Jury Instructions Committee of the Ohio Judicial Con-
ference.
Publication: Anderson Publishing Company.
Year. 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Ohio J.I. Civ. (2001).
NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE
Ohio J.I. Civ. 7.10 (2001)
1. NEGLIGENCE. What is negligence? Negligence is a failure to use
ordinary care. Every person is required to use ordinary care to avoid injur-
ing another person or another's property.
2. ORDINARY CARE. Ordinary care is the care that a reasonably
(cautious) (careful) (prudent) person would use under the same or similar
circumstances.
3. STATUTORY. A person may be required by law to do something
or not to do something. Failure to do what is required by law is negligence,
as is doing something the law prohibits.
4. ADDITIONAL-GREATER DANGER. The amount of care in-
creases in proportion to the danger which reasonably should be foreseen.
Ordinary care is a relative term. The test, though, is still ordinary care under
the circumstances.
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5. FORESEEABILITY. 1 O.J.I. 7.13.
CUSTOM AND USAGE
Ohio J.1. Civ. 7.11 (2001)
1. CUSTOM. Since the act (activity) of the defendant(s) involves a
matter not within common knowledge, evidence was introduced as to what
the defendant and others customarily do under the circumstances.
2. WEIGHT OF CUSTOM. Evidence of customary (methods) (con-
duct) of others similarly situated is not a test of negligence. You may con-
sider the degree to which such methods have been customarily used and
accepted if the defendant had knowledge of them. If there is a commonly
accepted custom or usage which the defendant knew or should have known,
you may consider this along with all other facts and circumstances in the case
in deciding whether ordinary care was used by the defendant.
3. DEFENDANT-NO KNOWLEDGE OF DISABILITY. The exis-
tence of plaintiff's (disability) (infirmity) does not increase the duty of the
defendant in the exercise of ordinary care unless you find that such (disabil-
ity) (infirmity) was known to the defendant, or unless you find that in the use
of ordinary care the defendant knew or should have known of the (disability)
(infirmity) of the plaintiff.
4. WITH NOTICE OF DISABILITY. If you find that the defendant
(knew) (in the exercise of ordinary care should have known) that the plain-
tiff had a (disability) (infirmity), then such knowledge or the extent of notice
of the (disability) (infirmity) is one of the circumstances to be considered in
deciding whether the defendant used the same amount of care that a rea-
sonably (cautious) (careful) (prudent) person would use toward such a
(disabled) (infirm) person under the same or similar circumstances.
FORESEEABILITY
Ohio J.1. Civ. 7.13 (2001)
1. GENERAL. In deciding whether ordinary care was used, you will
consider whether the defendant (either party) ought to have foreseen under
the circumstances that the natural and probable result of an act or failure to
act would cause some (injury) (damage).
2. TEST. The test for foreseeability is not whether he (they) should
have foreseen the (injury) (damage) (precisely) (exactly) as it happened to
the specific (person) (property). The test is whether under all the circum-
stances a reasonably (cautious) (careful) (prudent) person would have
anticipated that (injury) (damage) was likely to result to (someone) (some-
thing) from the act or failure to act.
3. CONCLUSION. If (defendant) (plaintiff) (either party), by the use
of ordinary care, should have foreseen some (injury) (damage) and should
not have acted, or if (he) (they) did act, should have taken precautions to
avoid the result, then the performance of the act or the failure to take such
precautions is negligence.
4. Remote cause or condition omitted.
5. Blasting omitted.
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ORDINARY CARE UNDER DANGEROUS CIRCUMSTANCES
Ohio J.1. Civ. 7.15 (2001)
1. The defendant distributes and sells (gas) (electricity) for domestic
and commercial purposes. (Gas) (Electricity) is an inherently dangerous
substance. The defendant in the use of ordinary care must use an amount of
care that is proportionate to the danger. (It) (He) must use such care as
reasonably careful and skilled persons, engaged in the same business, would
use under the same or similar circumstances to (install) (inspect) (maintain)
(control) its equipment that conveys (gas) (electricity) in large quantities
(and to keep such equipment in a reasonably safe condition). A failure to
use this degree of care constitutes negligence.
CARE IN SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Ohio J.I. Civ. 7.17 (2001)
1. The defendant is required to prove by the greater weight of the evidence
that he was confronted by a sudden or unexpected emergency, that the
claimed emergency was not the result of any (fault) (negligence) of the
defendant, or any circumstance under his control, and that (he) (the defen-
dant) exercised such care as a reasonably (cautious) (careful) (prudent)
person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY-LEGAL EXCUSE
Ohio J.1. Civ. 7.18 (2001)
1. GENERAL. The defendant claims that although he did violate a
statute (in crossing to the left of the center line), this action was not negli-
gence because he was faced with a sudden emergency.
2. ISSUE OF SUDDEN EMERGENCY. An operator of a motor ve-
hicle who (fails to comply with a safety statute) (crosses to the left of the
center line) is excused from such failure to comply with the statute, and he
avoids the legal effect of negligence arising therefrom by establishing by the
greater weight of the evidence that, without fault on his part and because of
circumstances over which he had no control, he was confronted by a sudden
and unforeseeable emergency which made compliance with such statute
impossible. If you find that these conditions existed, the defendant is ex-
cused from a violation of such statute.
INTOXICATION
Ohio J.1. Civ. 7.19 (2001)
1. If you should find that the (defendant) (plaintiff) was under the influ-
ence of (alcohol) (drug of abuse), such fact would not necessarily make him
negligent. However, every person is required to use ordinary care at all
times. Being under the influence of is not an excuse for a failure
to fully perform this or any other duty. If you find that the (defendant)
(plaintiff) was under the influence of (alcohol) (drug of abuse) at the time
(of the collision), you will consider that fact along with the evidence to
decide whether he used ordinary care under the circumstances.
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2. If you find that the (defendant) (plaintiff) did use the (degree)
(amount) of care that a reasonably (cautious) (careful) (prudent) and sober
person would have used under the same or similar circumstances, then it
would not matter if he was under the influence of . On the other
hand, if you find that he did not use that amount of ordinary care then he
was negligent.
ACT OF GOD
Ohio J.1. Civ. 7.27 (2001)
1. ACT OF GOD. A defendant cannot be held responsible for (any
injury) (damages) caused solely by an act of God. An act of God is any
event that is caused by natural forces beyond human control, such as earth-
quake, violent storm, lightning or flood, and that could not be reasonably
anticipated or guarded against.
2. CONDUCT DURING DISASTER. (Modify 1 O.J.I. 7.17 or 7.18 for
conduct during an emergency.)
3. SOLE CAUSE. A defendant cannot escape responsibility for (any
injury) (damages) unless it was proximately caused solely by an act of God.
If the (injury) (damages) (was) (were) proximately caused by the negligence
of the defendant combined with an act of God, the defendant is responsible.
4. SEVERAL CAUSES. (Modify 1 O.J.I. 11.10 § 3 to explain the com-
bination of negligence and act of god.)
5. BURDEN. The burden of proving that the (injury) (damages) (was)
(were) caused by an act of God which could not have been reasonably an-
ticipated and which was the sole proximate cause of the damage rests upon
the defendant.
6. CONCLUSION. If you find that the defendant was negligent and
that his negligence, either alone or in combination with an act of God,
proximately contributed to cause plaintiff's (damage) (injury), then your
verdict must be for the plaintiff. If you fail to find that the defendant was
negligent, or if you fail to find that his negligence, if any, was a proximate
cause, or if you find that circumstances constituting an act of God were the
sole proximate cause of plaintiff's (damage) (injury), then your verdict must
be for the defendant.
NEGLIGENCE-GENERAL PRESUMPTIONS MAY ASSUME
THAT OTHERS WILL OBEY THE LAW
Ohio J.I. Civ. 7.30(3) (2001)
Every (person) (driver) has the right to assume, in the absence of notice
or knowledge to the contrary, that others on the highway will (observe the
law) (use ordinary care).
OKLAHOMA
Title: Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions.
Author. Oklahoma Supreme Court for Uniform Civil Jury Instructions.




Hereinafter cited as: Okla. U.J.I. Civ. (1993 2d ed. & Supp. 2002).
NEGLIGENCE -DEFINED
Okla. U.J.I. Civ. 9.2 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2002)
"Negligence" is the failure to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to
another's person or property. "Ordinary care" is the care which a reasona-
bly careful person would use under the same or similar circumstances. The
law does not say how a reasonable careful person would act under those
circumstances. That is for you to decide. Thus, under the facts in evidence
in this case, if a party failed to do something which a reasonably careful
person would do, or did something which a reasonably careful person would
not do, such party would be negligent.
ORDINARY CARE-DEFINED
Okla. U.J.I. Civ. 9.3 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2002)
Ordinary care is the care which a reasonably careful person would use
under the same or similar circumstances.
VOLUNTEER-DUTY OF CARE
Okla. U.J.I. Civ. 9.5 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2002)
One who voluntarily assumes the care of another who is not capable of
caring for [himself/herself] is under a duty to act as a reasonably careful
person would under similar circumstances.
OREGON
Title: Uniform Civil Jury Instructions.
Author. Oregon State Bar.
Publication: Oregon State Bar Continuing Legal Education.
Year. 1993.
Hereinafter cited as: Or. U.C.J.I. Civ. (1993).
NEGLIGENCE AND CAUSATION
Or. U.C.J.I. Civ. 20.01 (1993)
The law assumes that all persons have obeyed the law and have been
free from negligence. Accordingly, the mere fact that an accident occurred
or that a party sustained injury or damage is no indication of negligence on
the part of anyone.
To recover, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant was negligent in at least one respect charged in the plain-
tiff's complaint which was a cause of damage to the plaintiff. [Similarly, for
the defendant to prevail on the defendant's claims of contributory negli-
gence, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff was negligent in at least on respect charged in the defendant's
answer which was a cause of any damage to the plaintiff.]
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COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE
Or. U.CJ.I. Civ. 20.04 (1993)
In general, it is the duty of every person in our society to use reasonable
care to avoid damage that would be reasonably anticipated.
Reasonable care is that care that persons or ordinary prudence exercise
in the management of their own affairs to avoid injury to themselves or
others.
Common-law negligence, therefore, is the doing of some act that a rea-
sonably careful person would not do, or the failure to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do under the same or similar circumstances.
The care exercised should be in keeping with dangers, apparent or rea-
sonably foreseeable at the time and place in question, and not in the light of
the resulting sequence of events or hindsight.
RIGHT TO ASSUME LAW OBEYED
Or. U.C.J.I. Civ. 20.06 (1993)
Every person has a right to assume that others will obey the law, unless
and until that person knows or in the exercise of reasonable care would
know otherwise.
FORESEEABILITY
Or. U.C.J.I. Civ. 20.07 (1993)
A person is liable only for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
his or her actions. There are two things that must be foreseeable. First, the
plaintiff must be within the general class of persons that one reasonably
would anticipate might be threatened by the defendant's conduct. Second,
the harm suffered must be within the general class of harms that one rea-
sonably would anticipate might result from the defendant's conduct.
EMERGENCY
Or. U.C.J.I. Civ. 20.08 (1993)
People who are suddenly placed in a position of peril through no negli-
gence of their own, and who are compelled to act without opportunity for
reflection, are not negligent if they make such a choice as a reasonably
careful person placed in such a position might make, even though they do
not make the wisest choice.
INTOXICATION
Or. U.CJ.I. Civ. 22.01 (1993)
The care required of a person who has become intoxicated is the same
as that required of one who is sober. Failure by a person to use that same
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent sober person would use under the




Title: Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions.
Author: The Civil Instructions Subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions.
Publication: The Pennsylvania Bar Institute.
Year. 1981, 1997, 1999.
Hereinafter cited as: Pa. S.J.I. Civ. (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp.
1999).
NEGLIGENCE- DEFINITION
Pa. S.J.I. Civ. 3.01 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999)
The legal term negligence, otherwise known as carelessness, is the
absence of ordinary care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise
in the circumstances here presented. Negligent conduct may consist either of
an actor or an omission to act when there is a duty to do so. In other words,
negligence is the failure to do something which a careful person would not
do, in light of all the surrounding circumstances established by the evidence
in this case. It is for you to determine how a reasonably careful person
would act in those circumstances.
ORDINARY CARE -DEFINITION
Pa. SJ.I. Civ. 3.02 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999)
Ordinary care is the care a reasonably careful person would use under the
circumstances presented in this case. It is the duty of every person to use
ordinary care not only for his own safety and the protection of his property,
but also to avoid injury to others. What constitutes ordinary care varies
according to the particular circumstances and conditions existing then and
there. The amount of care required by the law must be in keeping with the
degree of danger involved.
DUTY OF CARE (Inherently Dangerous Instrumentality)
Pa. S.J.I. Civ. 3.16 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999)
Anyone who provides, supplies, or used an inherently dangerous in-
strumentality, such as the (high voltage electric current) (acids, corrosives,
explosives) (provided) (supplied) (used) by the defendant in this case, is
required by law to use the highest degree of care practicable to avoid injury
to everyone who may be lawfully in the area of such activity.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Pa. S.J.1. Civ. 3.18 (1981 & 3d Supp. 1997 & Supp. 1999)
The defendant claims that he was confronted with a "sudden emer-
gency," and the burden of proving this defense is on the defendant. He is
required to show that, suddenly and without warning, he was confronted
with a dangerous situation he did not create and which required immediate
evasive action.
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A defendant faced with a sudden emergency is still required to respond
reasonably. The reasonableness of his response must be determined in light
of the circumstances and the time the defendant had to react and not
whether he could have responded differently if he had more time to think.
If you find that there was no emergency or that the emergency was
created by the defendant, then the defendant has not met his burden of
proof.
If you find that the defendant has proven that he was confronted with a
sudden emergency not of his own making, you must determine whether the
defendant's response to that emergency was reasonable under the circum-
stances. If you find that the defendant's response was reasonable under the
circumstances, your verdict must be for the defendant.
[The plaintiff claims that the defendant responded recklessly and the
burden of proving recklessness is on the plaintiff. Give 3.17 (Civ.) Reckless
Conduct charge. If you find that the defendant's response was reckless, your
verdict must be for the plaintiff. That is because contributory negligence is
not a defense to recklessness.]
RHODE ISLAND
Title: Model Civil Jury Instructions for Rhode Island.
Author: Rhode Island Bar Association; Superior Court Bench/Bar
Committee.
Publication: Rhode Island Bar Association.
Year 1998.
Hereinafter cited as: R.I. M.J.I. Civ. (1998).
ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE
R.I. M.J.I. Civ. 1001 (1998)
In a negligence action the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached this duty of
care and that the defendant's breach of that duty was a proximate cause of
the harm or injury about which the plaintiff complains. The question of
whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff is a question for
the Court. I am instructing you that under circumstances of this case, the
defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to [describe specific duty]. The question
for the jury in this case is whether the defendant breached that duty and
whether that breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON
R.I. M.J.. Civ. 1003 (1998)
The standard by which conduct is to be measured in determining
whether due care has been exercised under the circumstances is that of an
ordinary prudent person. In other words, what would an ordinary, prudent




R.I. M.J.I. Civ. 1305 (1998)
(a) In this case [plaintiff/defendant] alleges he/she was faced with a
"sudden emergency" to explain why he/she acted the way he/she did just
before the accident. A sudden emergency is a situation or circumstance
which calls for immediate action. A sudden emergency is a situation that
could not have been anticipated by an ordinarily careful person. When a
person is faced with a sudden emergency not brought about by his/her own
conduct and the person is required by the emergency to act without suffi-
cient time to determine the best course of action, [plaintiff/defendant] is not
held to the same standard of judgment as would be required if he/she had
time to deliberate.
(b) When a person is faced with a sudden emergency, he/she must act
reasonably in considering the emergency circumstance but the exigent or
emergency nature of the circumstance becomes a factor which you may
consider in determining whether [plaintiff/defendant] acted with ordinary
care under the circumstances which confronted him/her.
(c) A person can claim a sudden emergency existed only if you find that
[plaintiff/defendant] could not have reasonably foreseen the occurrence of
the emergency. A person whose own negligence created or contributed to
the emergency cannot say it was a sudden emergency.
(d) If a person without fault of his/her own is faced with a sudden
emergency, he/she is not held to the same correctness of judgment and
action as if he/she had time and opportunity to fully consider the situation.
If you find that [plaintiff/defendant] was confronted with a sudden emer-
gency, the fact that he/she did not choose the best or safest way of escaping
the danger does not mean that the person's conduct constituted negligence.
The standard of care required in an emergency situation is that care which a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised when placed in a similar
situation.
(e) If you find that [plaintiff/defendant] was faced with a sudden emer-
gency on [date of incident] and you find that [plaintiff/defendant] acted as a
reasonably prudent person would when confronted with the emergency
situation, then you must render a verdict for [plaintiff/defendant].
SOUTH CAROLINA
Title: Ervin's South Carolina Requests to Charge-Civil.
Author. Tom J. Ervin.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1994, 1995.
Hereinafter cited as: S.C. P.J.I. Civ. (1994 & Supp. 1995).
ELEMENTS
S.C. P.J.I. Civ. 23-8 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
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Negligence means that a person did not use the same amount of care
that a person of ordinary reason and prudence would exercise in the same
circumstances. The word "careless" means the same thing.
To prevail in a cause of action against a defendant for negligence, the
plaintiff must prove three essential elements by the greater weight or pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
First, he must show that the defendant was negligent, that is, that he did
not use the same amount of care that a person ordinarily would have exer-
cised in the same circumstances then existing.
Second, the plaintiff must prove that he was personally injured.
Third, he must prove that the defendant's negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT DEFENSE
S.C. P.J.I. Civ. 23-19 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
An injury [or death] may be caused by an unforeseen mishap that is not
caused by or contributed to by the negligent conduct of any person or per-
sons. Such a mishap is called an "unavoidable accident" and any loss or
injury that results from it-no matter how grievous-must be allowed to
remain where it has fallen. There can be no recovery of damages from an
unavoidable accident.
To be an unavoidable accident, the event must be one that was unfore-
seen by the person injured by its occurrence. The standard is not necessarily
the intelligence or foresight of the average person-an event is unexpected if
it is not expected by the person who suffers it, even though every person of
common sense who knew the circumstances would think it certain to happen.
The burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the injuries he complains of
were not the result of an unavoidable accident. The mere fact that an acci-
dent happened, standing alone, does not permit you to assume that someone
had to have caused it.
SOUTH DAKOTA
Title: South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author. The State Bar of South Dakota.
Publication: The State Bar of South Dakota.
Year. 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000.
Hereinafter cited as: S.D. P.J.I. (1995 & rev. 1997, 1999, 2000).
IMPEACHMENT-PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OR
CONDUCT
S.D. P.J.I. Civ. 3-01 (1995 & rev. 1999)
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by introducing evidence
that on some former occasion the witness (made a statement or acted in a
manner) inconsistent with the witness's testimony in this case on a matter
material to the issues. Evidence of this kind may be considered by you in
connection with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence in deciding
the weight to be given to the testimony of that witness.
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IMPEACHMENT-PROOF OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
S.D. PJ.I. Civ. 3-02 (1995 & rev. 1999)
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by introducing evidence
that the witness has been convicted of a crime. You may consider evidence
of this kind in connection with all the other evidence presented in deciding
the weight to be given to the testimony of that witness.
NEGLIGENCE DEFINITION
S.D. P.J.I. Civ. 10-01 (1995 & rev. 1997)
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. It is the doing of some-
thing which a reasonable person would not do, or the failure to do something
which a reasonable person would do, under facts similar to those shown by
the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonable person would act
under facts similar to those shown by evidence. That is for you to decide.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
S.D. PJ.I. Civ. 12-01 (1995 & rev. 2000)
No instruction recommended.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
S.D. PJ.I. Civ. 12-03 (1995 & rev. 2000)
When a person is confronted with a sudden emergency, the person has
a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The defendant
is not relieved of liability because of a sudden emergency unless, based on
the facts, you find:
(1) That the defendant was confronted with a sudden and unexpected
danger;
(2) That defendant's own negligence did not bring about the dangerous
situation;
(3) That the defendant had at least two courses of action available after
perceiving the dangerous situation; and
(4) That the defendant's choice of action after confronting the danger
was a choice which a person exercising reasonable care would have
taken under similar circumstances, even though it may later develop
that some other choice would have been better.
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHER'S GOOD CONDUCT
S.D. P.J.I. Civ. 12-06 (1995)
A person who is exercising ordinary care has a right to assume that oth-
ers will perform their duty and obey the law. Unless there is a reasonable
cause for thinking otherwise, people can assume that they are not exposed to
danger from another person's violation of the law or duty of care.
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TENNESSEE
Title: Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author: Tennessee Judicial Conference; Committee on Pattern Jury In-
structions.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1997, 2000.
Hereinafter cited as: Tenn. T.P.I Civ. (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE
Tenn. T.P.I. Civ. 3.05 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000)
Negligence is the failure to use ordinary or reasonable care. It is either
doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do, or the
failure to do something that a reasonably careful person would do, under all
of the circumstances in this case.
A person may assume that every other person will use reasonable care,
unless a reasonably careful person has cause for thinking otherwise.
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHER'S NORMAL FACULTIES
Tenn. T.P.I Civ. 3.06 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000)
In the absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise, a person who
is using ordinary care has a right to assume that other persons are ordinarily
intelligent and possess normal sight and hearing.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Tenn. T.P.I Civ. 3.08 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000)
A person who is faced with a sudden or unexpected emergency that
calls for immediate action is not expected to use the same accuracy of judg-
ment as a person acting under normal circumstances who has time to think
and reflect before acting. A person faced with a sudden emergency is re-
quired to act as a reasonably careful person placed in a similar position. A
sudden emergency will not excuse the actions of a person whose own negli-
gence created the emergency.
If you find there was a sudden emergency that was not caused by any
fault of the person whose actions you are judging, you must consider this
factor in determining and comparing fault.
INTOXICATION AS NEGLIGENCE
Tenn. T.P.I Civ. 4.11 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000)
An intoxicated person is held to the same standard of reasonable care
as a sober person. Intoxication is not an excuse for the failure to act as a
reasonably careful person.
In determining whether or not a person was negligent, you should con-
sider whether or not that person was intoxicated at the time of the occur-
rence together with all other evidence.
[A person who has become voluntarily intoxicated is required to use the
same care as that of a sober person.]
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HIGH DUTY OF CARE IN DANGEROUS ACTIVITY
Tenn. T.P.I Civ. 4.21 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000)
Because of the great danger involved in (Describe activity) a reasonably
careful person will use extreme caution in that activity.
VOLUNTEERS
Tenn. T.P.I Civ. 4.30 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000)
There is no automatic duty to help a person in danger. If someone
having no special duty voluntarily undertakes to aid another person, there is
no responsibility for resulting damages unless the aid is rendered in such a
manner that it would be considered gross negligence. Negligence is a failure
to use ordinary care. Gross negligence includes not only the failure to exer-
cise ordinary care but also a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of
others or a callous indifference to the consequences of one's actions or
failure to act.
UTAH
Title: Model Utah Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author. Utah State Bar Model Jury Instructions Committee.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing (Michie).
Year 1993.
Hereinafter cited as: Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. (1993).
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.2 (1993)
A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other peo-
ple or property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable
care. Reasonable care does not require extraordinary caution or exceptional
skill. Reasonable care is what an ordinary, prudent person uses in similar
situations.
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the
situation. You must decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge
would do in a similar situation. Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to
act.
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negli-
gent conduct may recover compensation from the negligent party for those
injuries or damages.
FAULT/NEGLIGENCE NOT IMPLIED FROM INJURY ALONE
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.3 (1993)
The mere fact that an accident or injury occurred does not support a
conclusion that the defendant or any other party was at fault or was negli-
gent.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.4 (1993)
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The law recognizes that on rare occasions unavoidable accidents occur.
An unavoidable accident is one that arises from an unknown or unforeseen
cause, for which neither party is responsible.
AMOUNT OF CARE REQUIRED VARIES WITH CONDITIONS
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.6 (1993)
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the
situation. Some situations require more caution because a person of ordi-
nary prudence would understand that more danger is involved. In other
situations, less care is expected, such as when the risk of danger is lower or
when the situation happens so suddenly that a person of ordinary prudence
would not appreciate the danger.
AMOUNT OF CAUTION REQUIRED WHEN CHILDREN ARE
INVOLVED
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.7 (1993)
A person must exercise greater care for the protection of young chil-
dren than for adults. To satisfy this higher standard of care, a person is
expected to foresee and guard against the ordinary, impulsive behavior of
children.
AMOUNT OF CAUTION REQUIRED FOR DANGEROUS AC-
TIVITIES
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.8 (1993)
Because of the greater danger involved, those who are engaged in [de-
scribe activity] are held to a higher-than-ordinary standard of care and must
exercise extra caution for the protection of themselves and others. The
greater the danger, the greater the care that must be used.
ROLE OF CUSTOM IN JUDGING BEHAVIOR
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.10 (1993)
When deciding whether a person is negligent, you may consider cus-
toms of behavior, such as local customs, business customs or industry cus-
toms. However, following a custom does not necessarily mean a person
exercised ordinary care. It is merely a factor you may consider. A custom or
standard may be negligent in and of itself.
RIGHT TO ASSUME PROPER CONDUCT OF OTHERS
Utah M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.12 (1993)
A reasonably careful person may assume that other people (1) are rea-
sonably intelligent, (2) have normal sight and hearing, and (3) will obey the
law and be reasonably careful. However, a reasonably careful person will
not ignore obvious risks created by other persons.
VERMONT
Title: Vermont Jury Instructions.
Author. Tom Dinse.
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Publication: Lexis Law Publishing (Michie).
Year 1993.
Hereinafter cited as: Vt. P.J.I. Civ. (1993).
NEGLIGENCE- GENERAL
Vt. P.J.I. Civ. 7.17 (1993)
In his (her) complaint, (plaintiff) alleges that the injuries which he (she)
suffered were caused by the negligence of (defendant). (Plaintiff) alleges
that (defendant) is liable for negligence on the following theories: (Review
theories of negligence). I will instruct you on each of these theories in turn.
I instruct you that in order to prove that (defendant) was negligent on
any of these theories, (plaintiff) must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence of each of the following four elements:
1. that (defendant) owed (plaintiff) a duty;
2. that (defendant) breached that duty;
3. that (plaintiff) suffered injuries; and
4. that (defendant's) breach of its duty was a proximate cause of
(plaintiffs) injuries.
The first element of negligence, as I have stated, is duty. Duty, as it is
understood in the law, means a legal obligation to do or not do some act,
depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Your first task as the
jury will be to determine whether (plaintiff) has shown, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that (defendant) owed him (her) a duty. (Option: I instruct
you as a matter of law that (defendant) had a duty to plaintiff to (explain
duty).
The second element is breach. In considering whether a breach has
occurred, you must look at the evidence and determine if (defendant) or its
employees or agents adhered to the duty as imposed by law.
The third element is injury. I instruct you as a matter of law that (plain-
tiff) suffered injuries in this case.
The last element, proximate cause, is often the most difficult to explain.
In order to find (defendant) liable for the injuries to (plaintiff), you must
conclude that (defendant's) negligence was a proximate cause of (plaintiffs)
injuries.
A legal or proximate cause of an injury means that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury without which the result would not have occurred.
An injury or damages is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission
played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a rea-
sonably probable consequence of the act or omission.
You should keep in mind that the law does not recognize just one
proximate cause of an injury or damage, consisting of only one factor or the
conduct of only one person. On the contrary, many factors or things may
operate independently to cause injury or damage, and each may be a proxi-
mate or legal cause of some or all of an injury.
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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE PROPORTIONATE TO FORE-
SEEABLE RISKS
Vt. PJ.I. Civ. 7.19 (1993)
Duty, as I have used it in these instructions, means a legal obligation to
do or not do some act, depending on the particular circumstances of the case.
Keep in mind that under Vermont law, the duty of due care increases
proportionately with the foreseeable risks of the operations involved. Thus,
as the risk of harm increases to (plaintiff), (defendant's) duty of due care to
prevent injury is correspondingly increased.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE
Vt. P.J.I. Civ. 7.33 (1993)
As part of his (her) defense in this case, (defendant) claims that his (her)
actions were taken in response to a sudden emergency. If you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that (defendant) was confronted with a
sudden peril, then you may consider that fact in determining whether (de-
fendant's) conduct was negligent.
As the Vermont Supreme Court has stated this doctrine,
[w]hen one is confronted with a sudden peril through no fault of his
own, he is not held to the exercise of the same degree of care as when
he has time for reflection, for the law recognizes that a prudent man so
brought face to face with an unexpected danger may fail to use the best
judgment, may omit some precaution he could have taken or may not
choose the best available method of meeting the dangers of the situa-
tion. Under such circumstances, he is not negligent if he does what a
prudent man would or might have done.
(Example) As applied to the instant case, you may find that the sudden and
forceful application of his brakes and the turning to the left by (defendant)
was a prudent action for him to take when faced with the sudden peril or
emergency even though you may feel that perhaps, it might have been bet-
ter, upon reflection, to have turned to the right and not applied the brakes so
forcefully.
VIRGINIA
Title: Virginia Model Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author. Model Jury Instructions Committee.
Publication: Lexis Law Publishing (Michie).
Year. 1998, 2001.
Hereinafter cited as: Va. M.J.I. Civ. (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001).
DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE
Va. M.J.I. Civ. 4.000 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001)
Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care. Ordinary care is the care
a reasonable person would have used under the circumstances of this case.
FACT OF ACCIDENT IS NOT PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
Va. M.J.I. Civ. 4.015 (1998 repl. ed.)
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The fact that there was an accident and that the plaintiff was injured does
not, of itself, entitle the plaintiff to recover.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Va. M.J.I. Civ. 4.018 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001)
An unavoidable accident is one which ordinary care and diligence could
not have prevented or one which occurred in the absence of negligence by
any party to this action.
SUDDEN EMERGENCY
Va. M.J.I. Civ. 7.000 (1998 repl. ed. & Supp. 2001)
The defendant [plaintiff] contends that he was confronted with a sud-
den emergency. A sudden emergency is an event or a combination of cir-
cumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the
deliberate exercise of judgment.
If you believe from the evidence that the defendant [plaintiff], without
negligence on his part, was confronted with a sudden emergency and acted
as a reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances of this
case, he was not negligent [contributorily negligent].
WASHINGTON
Title: Washington Pattern Jury Instruction-Civil.
Author. Washington Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions.
Publication: West Group Publishing.
Year. 1989.
Hereinafter cited as: Wash. W.P.I. Civ. (1989).
NEGLIGENCE -ADULT- DEFINITION
Wash. W.P.I. Civ. 10.01 (1989)
Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is the doing of
some act which a reasonably careful person would not do under the same or
similar circumstances or the failure to do something which a reasonably
careful person would have done under the same or similar circumstances.
ORDINARY CARE -ADULT- DEFINITION
Wash. W.P.I. Civ. 10.02 (1989)
Ordinary care means the care a reasonably careful person would exer-
cise under the same or similar circumstances
DUTY TO USE ORDINARY CARE-ADULT-DEFENDANT
Wash. W.P.I. Civ. 10.04 (1989)
(The Committee recommends that no instruction be given on the "duty
of an adult defendant to use ordinary care.")
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
Wash. W.P.I. Civ. 12.01 (1989)
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A person who becomes intoxicated voluntarily is held to the same stan-
dard of care as one who is not so affected. [Whether a person is intoxicated
at the time of an occurrence may be considered by the jury, together with all
the other facts and circumstances, in determining whether that person was
negligent.]
DUTY OF ONE CONFRONTED BY AN EMERGENCY
Wash. W.P.I. Civ. 12.02 (1989)
A person who is suddenly confronted by an emergency through no neg-
ligence of his or her own and who is compelled to decide instantly how to
avoid injury and who makes such a choice as a reasonably careful person
placed in such a position might make, is not negligent even though it is not
the wisest choice.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Wash. W.P.I. Civ. 12.03 (1989)
(The Committee recommends that no instruction be given on "un-
avoidable accident.")
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS WILL OBEY LAW
Wash W.P.I. Civ. 12.07 (1989)
Every person has the right to assume that others will use ordinary care
[and comply with the law], and a person has a right to proceed on such
assumption until he or she knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
know, to the contrary.
WISCONSIN
Title: Wisconsin Jury Instructions-Civil.
Author: Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction Committee for Wisconsin Ju-
dicial Conference.
Publication: University of Wisconsin Extension, Department of Law.
Year. 1989, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2002.
Hereinafter cited as: Wis. J.I. Civ. (1989, 1992, 1994, or 1999 ed. &
Supp. 2002).
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Wis. J.I. Civ. 1000 (1989 & Supp. 2002)
The committee believes that no instruction is needed on this subject
since, in most cases, there is some evidence of negligence as to a party, or
else it is clear that the party is not negligent.
NEGLIGENCE: FAULT: ULTIMATE FACT VERDICT
Wis. J.I. Civ. 1001 (1992 & Supp. 2002)
Questions 1 and 2 of the verdict inquire whether the parties to the
collision were at fault. "Fault," as used here, involves two ele-
ments-negligence and cause. To establish legal fault, the conduct under
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consideration must be negligent, and it must be a cause of the injury and
damages.
"Negligence" means a failure to exercise ordinary care. "Ordinary care"
is that degree of care which the great mass of mankind, or the ordinarily
prudent man, exercises under like or similar circumstances. A person fails to
exercise ordinary care-or in other words, is negligent-when, without
intending to do harm, the person does an act or omits to take a precaution
under circumstances in which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence
ought reasonably to foresee that such act or omission will subject the person
or property of another to an unreasonable risk of harm.
In addition to this general definition of negligence, there are rules of
law, as well as statutes enacted by the legislature, for the safe operation of
motor vehicles, violation of which establishes negligence.
(Here add appropriate instructions on specific kinds of negligence.)
In considering "cause" as an element of fault, you will consider it from
the standpoint of relationship of cause and effect between the negligence of
either or both parties, if found by you, and the collision and the resulting
injuries and damages. There may be more than one cause of a collision. The
negligence of one person alone might produce it, or the acts or omissions of
two or more persons might jointly produce it. Before such relationship of
cause and effect can be found to exist, it must appear that the negligence
under consideration was a substantial factor in producing the collision and
the resulting damages. That is to say, that the negligence was a factor actu-
ally operating and which had a substantial effect in producing the collision
and the results.
Before you can find either party at fault, you must be satisfied to a
reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence, first, that
the party was negligent, as that term has been defined for you, and, second,
that such negligence was a cause acting as a substantial factor in producing
the collision and the natural results thereof. If you can be so satisfied by that
degree of proof that either or both parties were at fault, then you will so
find -otherwise not.
After determining whether these parties were or were not at fault, under
the instructions I have given you, you will consider and determine what
percentage of the fault of each, if found, contributed to the collision and the
natural results thereof. Total fault is based on 100%. If you find only one
party at fault, then of course, that person's contribution to the collision and
the results would be 100%. If you find both parties at fault, then you will
consider the fault of each party, weigh its contribution in producing the
collision and the results, and fix it in such a percentage of the total fault
which is, by the greater weight of the credible evidence to a reasonable
certainty, proved to be attributable to the person named in the question.
Questions 1 and 2 are to be answered in terms of percentages if the party
inquired about is found to be at fault, as that term has been defined to you.
The burden of proof on either question is upon the party who claims another
is at fault. Such burden is to satisfy you to a reasonable certainty by the
greater weight of the evidence that fault exists and contributed in a specified
percentage to the collision and the natural results thereof.
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NEGLIGENCE: DEFINED
Wis. J.1. Civ. 1005 (1999 & Supp. 2002)
A person is negligent when (he)(she) fails to exercise ordinary care.
Ordinary care is the care which a reasonable person would use in similar
circumstances. A person is not using ordinary care and is negligent, if the
person, without intending to do harm, does something (or fails to do some-
thing) that a reasonable person would recognize as creating an unreasonable
risk of injury or damage to a person or property.
(In addition to this general definition of negligence, there are other
safety statutes enacted by the legislature, a violation of which is negligence
as that term is used in the verdict and these instructions.)
NEGLIGENCE: EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM AND USAGE
Wis. J.I. Civ. 1019 (1995 & Supp. 2002)
Evidence has been received as to the (practice in the community)
(custom in the trade or work operation) (practice in the industry) with
respect to (e.g., the use of 2 x 4's for rafters) (installations of 3/8" plywood
for subflooring) (standing on running board to guide truck backing into shale
pit). You should consider this evidence in determining whether (defendant)
acted with ordinary care. This evidence of practice is not conclusive as to
what meets the required standard for ordinary care or reasonable safety.
What is generally done by persons engaged in a similar activity has some
bearing on what an ordinarily prudent person would do under the same or
like circumstances. Custom, however, cannot overcome the requirement of
reasonable safety and ordinary care. A practice which is obviously unrea-
sonable and dangerous cannot excuse a person from responsibility for care-
lessness. On the other hand, a custom or practice which has a good safety
record under similar conditions could aid you in determining whether (de-
fendant) was negligent.
NEGLIGENCE: UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Wis. J.I. Civ. 1020 (1989 & Supp. 2002)
[While the rule never changes that a (person) (motor vehicle driver)
(pedestrian) must exercise ordinary care, the degree of care or diligence
which a person must exercise to come up to the standard of ordinary care
varies with the circumstances naturally calculated to affect or increase the
hazard of collision or injury. The greater the danger which is or may be
apparent to an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances existing,
the greater must be the degree of care which must be used to guard against
such danger.]
[The ordinary care which the law requires varies with the circumstances
naturally calculated to affect or increase the hazard of injury or collision.
(Under some circumstances. ordinary care may be a high degree of caution:
whereas. under other circumstances, a slight degree of caution may be ordi-
nary care.) The greater the danger which is or may be apparent to an ordi-
nary prudent person under the circumstances existing, the greater must be
the degree of care which must be used to guard against such danger.]
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WYOMING
Title: Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions.
Author. Wyoming State Bar.
Publication: Wyoming State Bar.
Year. 1993.
Hereinafter cited as: Wyo. P.J.1. Civ. (1993).
NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE DEFINED
Wyo. P.J.I. Civ. 3.02 (1993)
When the word negligence is used in these instructions, it means the
failure to use ordinary care. Ordinary care means the degree of care which
should reasonably be expected of the ordinary careful person under the
same or similar circumstances. The law does not say how such an ordinary
careful person would act. That is for you to decide.
CUSTOM
Wyo. P.J.I. Civ. 3.08 (1993)
In determining whether anyone was or was not negligent, you may con-
sider any evidence of any custom of a profession in conducting its opera-
tions. However, the standard of care is not fixed by custom, as custom
cannot overcome the requirements of reasonable safety and ordinary care.
The standard is always ordinary care and the presence or absence of custom
does not alter that standard. What others do is some evidence of what
should be done, but is not conclusive evidence, and is never a substitute for
ordinary care. An operational practice, although long indulged in, but which
does not afford reasonable protection to those engaged in that operation,
does not relieve from liability those responsible if it results in negligently
causing injury or damage.
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